[OpenFontLibrary] Typeface Copyright

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>> No, the copyright treaties the United States has entered into  specify 
>> that something copyrighted in a foreign country is not  subject to 
>> copyright in the U.S. *unless* it would have been  subject to copyright 
>> if it were made in the U.S. Typefaces are not  subject to copyright in 
>> the U.S., no matter where they were  made.
>>  
>> FF
>
>Unless there is an actual  case involving a typeface you can cite, isn't 
>what you say just an  opinion? Should it ever come to that, are you ready 
>  to shell out  real money for real lawyer to prove this point?
>
>-  Chris

Yes, there is a major case about this: Eltra v. Ringer. This case  confirms 
typefaces are not subject to copyright:

_http://altlaw.org/v1/cases/535269_ (http://altlaw.org/v1/cases/535269) 
ELTRA  CORPORATION, Appellant, v. Barbara A. RINGER, Appellee, 
International  Typographic Compositon Association and Advertising Typographers 
Association of  America, Inc., Amici Curiae.
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth  Circuit
June 14, 1978
579 F.2d 294; 198 U.S.P.Q. 321
 
E. Fulton Brylawski, Washington, D. C. (J. Michael Cleary, Robert H.  
Johnson, Senior Patent Atty., Eltra Corp., Toledo, Ohio, Henry W. Leeds, Mason,  
Fenwick & Lawrence, Washington, D. C., W. Gibson Harris, Annie Marie  
Whittemore, McGuire, Woods & Battle, Richmond, Va., on brief), for  appellant.
 
Jon A. Baumgarten, Gen. Counsel, Library of Congress, New York City  
(Dorothy M. Schrader, Senior Atty., Library of Congress, James H. Simmonds,  
Arlington, Va., on brief), for appellee.
 
Hazel, Beckhorn & Hanes, Fairfax, Va. (Cowen, Liebowitz & Latman,  New York 
City, on brief), for amici curiae International Typographic Composition  
Ass'n and Advertising Typographers Association of America, Inc.
 
Before WINTER, RUSSELL and WIDENER, Circuit Judges.
 
DONALD RUSSELL, Circuit Judge:
 
1
This appeal involves the application of the Copyright Act.1 The  appellant 
is a manufacturer of typesetting equipment. It filed for registration  with 
the Copyright Office a design of an alphabet and other typographical  
symbols placed on devices used in connection with its equipment. Such symbols  are 
generally known as "typeface designs."2 The design of the appellant had 
been  prepared by a well-known typeface designer, to whom the appellant paid 
$11,000  for the design. It sought registration of this typeface as a "work of 
art" under  the terms of what was then § 5(g) of the Copyright Act.3 The 
Chief of the  Examining Division of the Copyright Office refused to register 
the design,  finding that it contained "no elements, either alone or in 
combination, which  can be separately identified as a 'work of art.' " Such 
refusal represented the  final action of the Copyright Office on the proposed 
registration. Following  this rejection, the appellant instituted in the 
District Court its mandamus  action to compel the appellee, the Register of 
Copyrights, to register its  proposed copyright as a "work of art" under § 5(g).4 
Both parties made motions  for summary judgment. The District Court denied 
the appellant's motion but  granted the appellee's motion for summary 
judgment and dismissed the action.  This appeal followed.
 
2
We affirm.
 
3
The appellant's right to registration necessarily turns on whether its  
design submitted for registration qualified as a "work of art" as that term was 
 used in § 5(g). Congress offered no definition of "work of art" in the 
statute  nor is there in the legislative history any clear declaration of 
Congressional  intent in the use of the term. It did replace an earlier phrase, 
"work of fine  arts," used in the predecessor provision of the Act. 
Obviously, though, the  change in phraseology was "deliberately intended as a broader 
specification than  'works of fine arts' in the (earlier) statute."5 
Primarily, it seems to have  been adopted in order to eliminate any "(v)erbal 
distinctions between purely  aesthetic articles and useful works of art"6 in the 
application of the term  under the Act. And, in Mazer v. Stein (1954) 347 
U.S. 201, 74 S.Ct. 460, 98  L.Ed. 630, the Court gave effect to this obvious 
intention of the Congress in  its new phrasing.
 
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