[PATCH 01/13] drm/amdgpu: introduce and honour DRM_FORCE_AUTH workaround
Christian.Koenig at amd.com
Fri Jun 14 12:55:34 UTC 2019
Am 14.06.19 um 14:09 schrieb Emil Velikov:
> On 2019/05/27, Emil Velikov wrote:
> Hi Christian,
> In the following, I would like to summarise and emphasize the need for
> DRM_AUTH removal. I would kindly ask you to spend a couple of minutes
> extra reading it.
> Today DRM drivers* do not make any distinction between primary and
> render node clients.
That is actually not 100% correct. We have a special case where a DRM
master is allowed to change the priority of render node clients.
> Thus for a render capable driver, any premise of
> separation, security or otherwise imposed via DRM_AUTH is a fallacy.
Yeah, that's what I agree on. I just don't think that removing DRM_AUTH
now is the right direction to take.
> Considering the examples of flaky or outright missing drmAuth in prime
> open-source projects (mesa, kmscube, libva) we can reasonably assume
> other projects exbibit the same problem.
> For these and/or other reasons, two DRM drivers have dropped DRM_AUTH
> since day one.
> Since we are interested in providing consistent and predictable
> behaviour to user-space, dropping DRM_AUTH seems to be the most
> effective way forward.
Well and what do you do with drivers which doesn't implement render nodes?
> Of course, I'd be more than happy to hear for any other way to achieve
> the goal outlined.
> Based on the series, other maintainers agree with the idea/goal here.
> Amdgpu not following the same pattern would compromise predictability
> across drivers and complicate userspace, so I would kindly ask you to
> Alternatively, I see two ways to special case:
> - New flag annotating amdgpu/radeon - akin to the one proposed earlier
> - Check for amdgpu/radeon in core DRM
I perfectly agree that I don't want any special handling for amdgpu/radeon.
My key point is that with DRM_AUTH we created an authorization and
authentication mess in DRM which is functionality which doesn't belong
into the DRM subsystem in the first place.
> Now on your pain point - not allowing render iocts via the primary node,
> and how this patch could make it harder to achieve that goal.
> While I love the idea, there are number of obstacles that prevent us
> from doing so at this time:
> - Ensuring both old and new userspace does not regress
Yeah, agree totally. That's why I said we should probably start doing
this for only for upcoming hardware generations.
> - Drivers (QXL, others?) do not expose a render node
Well isn't that is a rather big problem for the removal of DRM_AUTH in
E.g. at least QXL would then expose functionality on the primary node
> - We want to avoid driver specific behaviour
> The only way forward that I can see is:
> - Address QXL/others to expose render nodes
> - Add a Kconfig toggle to disable !KMS ioctls via the primary node
> - Jump-start ^^ with distribution X
> - Fix user-space fallouts
> - X months down the line, flip the Kconfig
> - In case of regressions - revert the KConfig, goto Fix user-space...
Well that at least sounds like a plan :) Let's to this!
> That said, the proposal will not conflict with the DRM_AUTH removal. If
> anything it is step 0.5 of the grand master plan.
That's the point I strongly disagree on.
By lowering the DRM_AUTH restriction you are encouraging userspace to
use the shortcut and use the primary node for rendering instead of
fixing the code and using the render node.
So at the end of the day userspace will most likely completely drop
support for the render node, simply for the reason that it became
superfluous. You can just open up the primary node and get the same
I absolutely can't understand how you can argue that this won't make it
harder to cleanly separate rendering and primary node functionality.
> Tl;Dr: Removing DRM_AUTH is orthogonal to not allowing render iocts via
> the primary node. Here's an idea how to achieve the latter.
More information about the amd-gfx