[PATCH 01/13] drm/amdgpu: introduce and honour DRM_FORCE_AUTH workaround

Emil Velikov emil.l.velikov at gmail.com
Mon May 27 12:05:54 UTC 2019

On 2019/05/27, Koenig, Christian wrote:
> Am 27.05.19 um 10:17 schrieb Emil Velikov:
> > From: Emil Velikov <emil.velikov at collabora.com>
> >
> > Currently one can circumvent DRM_AUTH, when the ioctl is exposed via the
> > render node. A seemingly deliberate design decision.
> >
> > Hence we can drop the DRM_AUTH all together (details in follow-up patch)
> > yet not all userspace checks if it's authenticated, but instead uses
> > uncommon assumptions.
> >
> > After days of digging through git log and testing, only a single (ab)use
> > was spotted - the Mesa RADV driver, using the AMDGPU_INFO ioctl and
> > assuming that failure implies lack of authentication.
> >
> > Affected versions are:
> >   - the whole 18.2.x series, which is EOL
> >   - the whole 18.3.x series, which is EOL
> >   - the 19.0.x series, prior to 19.0.4
> Well you could have saved your time, cause this is still a NAK.
Did I mention that I've spent quite a bit of time in AMDVLK? Even fixed 
a bug while I was there :-)

> For the record: I strongly think that we don't want to expose any render 
> functionality on the primary node.
> To even go a step further I would say that at least on AMD hardware we 
> should completely disable DRI2 for one of the next generations.
It's doable and overall pretty neat idea.

There is a consern that this approach may cause far more regressions
that this series. We are talking about years worth of Mesa drivers (et
al) that depend on render functionality exposed via the primary node.

I'm OK with writing the patches, but it'll be up-to the AMDGPU team to
follow-up with any regressions. Are you ok with that?

Fwiw I could also move the FORCE_AUTH hack to core drm, if you prefer.


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