Loadable security modules for D-Bus

[Thiago Macieira]

On Monday, 9 de January de 2012 16.52.57, Lennart Poettering wrote:
> Note that I not only think that loadable modules would be a bad idea
> here, I also believe that any kind of abstraction towards that goal
> would already be wrong. i.e. from Felipe's patch dsm.c needs to go, too,
> regardless whether what is hooked in there would be dynamically or
> statically compiled.

That I don't agree. I think that having a clean API with the proper hooks into 
the security sensitive points is welcome. That has a few benefits:

1) we don't clutter the main code with #ifdefs for the different backends

2) new backends don't have to figure out where they need to hook up and how

This of course needs to be done properly, so that all the backends can be 
supported cleanly and correctly.

I would rather that there weren't multiple mechanisms, but that's not relevant 
in this discussion: they exist.
-- 
Thiago Macieira - thiago (AT) macieira.info - thiago (AT) kde.org
   Software Architect - Intel Open Source Technology Center
      PGP/GPG: 0x6EF45358; fingerprint:
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