[PATCH v4] DRM: add DRM Driver for Samsung SoC EXYNOS4210.

[Rob Clark]

On Tue, Sep 13, 2011 at 9:03 PM, Inki Dae <inki.dae at samsung.com> wrote:
> Hi Thomas.
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Thomas Hellstrom [mailto:thomas at shipmail.org]
>> Sent: Monday, September 12, 2011 3:32 PM
>> To: Rob Clark
>> Cc: Inki Dae; kyungmin.park at samsung.com; sw0312.kim at samsung.com; linux-
>> arm-kernel at lists.infradead.org; dri-devel at lists.freedesktop.org
>> Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] DRM: add DRM Driver for Samsung SoC EXYNOS4210.
>>
>> On 09/11/2011 11:26 PM, Thomas Hellstrom wrote:
>> > On 09/10/2011 07:31 PM, Rob Clark wrote:
>> >> On Sat, Sep 10, 2011 at 9:04 AM, Thomas
>> >> Hellstrom<thomas at shipmail.org>  wrote:
>> >>> On 09/09/2011 01:38 PM, Inki Dae wrote:
>> >>>> This patch is a DRM Driver for Samsung SoC Exynos4210 and now enables
>> >>>> only FIMD yet but we will add HDMI support also in the future.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> from now on, I will remove RFC prefix because I think we have got
>> >>>> comments
>> >>>> enough.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> this patch is based on git repository below:
>> >>>> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/airlied/drm-2.6.git,
>> >>>> branch name: drm-next
>> >>>> commit-id: bcc65fd8e929a9d9d34d814d6efc1d2793546922
>> >>>>
>> >>>> you can refer to our working repository below:
>> >>>> http://git.infradead.org/users/kmpark/linux-2.6-samsung
>> >>>> branch name: samsung-drm
>> >>>>
>> >>>> We tried to re-use lowlevel codes of the FIMD driver(s3c-fb.c
>> >>>> based on Linux framebuffer) but couldn't so because lowlevel codes
>> >>>> of s3c-fb.c are included internally and so FIMD module of this
>> >>>> driver has
>> >>>> its own lowlevel codes.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> We used GEM framework for buffer management and DMA APIs(dma_alloc_*)
>> >>>> for buffer allocation. by using DMA API, we could use CMA later.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Refer to this link for CMA(Continuous Memory Allocator):
>> >>>> http://lkml.org/lkml/2011/7/20/45
>> >>>>
>> >>>> this driver supports only physically continuous memory(non-iommu).
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Links to previous versions of the patchset:
>> >>>> v1:<    https://lwn.net/Articles/454380/>
>> >>>> v2:<    http://www.spinics.net/lists/kernel/msg1224275.html>
>> >>>> v3:<    http://www.gossamer-threads.com/lists/linux/kernel/1423684>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Changelog v2:
>> >>>> DRM: add DRM_IOCTL_SAMSUNG_GEM_MMAP ioctl command.
>> >>>>
>> >>>>      this feature maps user address space to physical memory region
>> >>>>      once user application requests DRM_IOCTL_SAMSUNG_GEM_MMAP ioctl.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> DRM: code clean and add exception codes.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Changelog v3:
>> >>>> DRM: Support multiple irq.
>> >>>>
>> >>>>      FIMD and HDMI have their own irq handler but DRM Framework can
>> >>>> regiter
>> >>>>      only one irq handler this patch supports mutiple irq for
>> >>>> Samsung SoC.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> DRM: Consider modularization.
>> >>>>
>> >>>>      each DRM, FIMD could be built as a module.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> DRM: Have indenpendent crtc object.
>> >>>>
>> >>>>      crtc isn't specific to SoC Platform so this patch gets a crtc
>> >>>>      to be used as common object.
>> >>>>      created crtc could be attached to any encoder object.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> DRM: code clean and add exception codes.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Changelog v4:
>> >>>> DRM: remove is_defult from samsung_fb.
>> >>>>
>> >>>>      is_default isn't used for default framebuffer.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> DRM: code refactoring to fimd module.
>> >>>>      this patch is be considered with multiple display objects and
>> >>>>      would use its own request_irq() to register a irq handler
>> >>>> instead of
>> >>>>      drm framework's one.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> DRM: remove find_samsung_drm_gem_object()
>> >>>>
>> >>>> DRM: move kernel private data structures and definitions to driver
>> >>>> folder.
>> >>>>
>> >>>>      samsung_drm.h would contain only public information for
> userspace
>> >>>>      ioctl interface.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> DRM: code refactoring to gem modules.
>> >>>>      buffer module isn't dependent of gem module anymore.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> DRM: fixed security issue.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> DRM: remove encoder porinter from specific connector.
>> >>>>
>> >>>>      samsung connector doesn't need to have generic encoder.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> DRM: code clean and add exception codes.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Signed-off-by: Inki Dae<inki.dae at samsung.com>
>> >>>> Signed-off-by: Joonyoung Shim<jy0922.shim at samsung.com>
>> >>>> Signed-off-by: SeungWoo Kim<sw0312.kim at samsung.com>
>> >>>> Signed-off-by: kyungmin.park<kyungmin.park at samsung.com>
>> >>>> ---
>> >>>>
>> >>>> +static struct drm_ioctl_desc samsung_ioctls[] = {
>> >>>> +       DRM_IOCTL_DEF_DRV(SAMSUNG_GEM_CREATE,
>> >>>> samsung_drm_gem_create_ioctl,
>> >>>> +                       DRM_UNLOCKED | DRM_AUTH),
>> >>>>
>> >>> Hi!
>> >>>
>> >>> With reference my previous security comment.
>> >>>
>> >>> Let's say you have a compromised video player running as a DRM
>> >>> client, that
>> >>> tries to repeatedly allocate huge GEM buffers...
>> >>>
>> >>> What will happen when all DMA memory is exhausted? Will this cause
>> >>> other
>> >>> device drivers to see an OOM, or only DRM?
>> >>>
>> >>> The old DRI model basically allowed any authorized DRI client to
>> >>> exhaust
>> >>> video ram or AGP memory, but never system memory. Newer DRI drivers
>> >>> typically only allow DRI masters to do that.
>> >>> as
>> >>>
>> >>> I don't think an authorized DRI client should be able to easily
>> exhaust
>> >>> resources (DMA memory) used by other device drivers causing them to
>> >>> fail.
>> >> I'm not entirely sure what else can be done, other than have a
>> >> threshold on max MB allocatable of buffer memory..
>> >
>> > Yes, I think that's what needs to be done, and that threshold should
>> > be low enough to keep other device drivers running in the worst
>> > allocation case.
>> >
>> >> In the samsung driver case, he is only allocating scanout memory from
>> >> CMA, so the limit will be the CMA region size.. beyond that you can't
>> >> get physically contiguous memory.  So I think this driver is safe.
>> >
>> > It's not really what well-behaved user-space drivers do that should be
>> > a concern, but what compromized application *might* do that is a
> concern.
>>
>> Hmm. I might have missed your point here. If the buffer allocation ioctl
>> only allows allocating CMA memory, then I agree the driver fits the old
>> DRI security model, as long as no other devices on the platform will
>> ever use CMA.
>>
>> But in that case, there really should be a way for the driver to say
>> "Hey, all CMA memory on this system is mine", in the same way
>> traditional video drivers can claim the VRAM PCI resource.
>>
>
> CMA could reserve memory region for a specific driver so DRM Client could
> request memory allocation from only the region.
>
>> This is to avoid the possibility that future drivers that need CMA will
>> be vulnerable to DOS-attacks from ill-behaved DRI clients.
>>
>
> Thomas, if any application has root authority for ill-purpose then isn't it
> possible to be vulnerable to DOS-attacks? I think DRM_AUTH means root
> authority. I know DRM Framework gives any root application DRM_AUTH
> authority for compatibility.

DRM_AUTH just means that the client has authenticated w/ X11 (meaning
that it has permission to connect to x server)..

But I think that since memory allocation is limited to the size of the
CMA region, that this puts a reasonable cap of the memory that can be
allocated by the client.  If this is a problem, it certainly isn't the
worst problem.  You could still limit via file permissions the users
that can open the DRM device file, so it is really no worse than other
devices like v4l2..

BR,
-R


>> /Thomas
>>
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