[PATCH 3/5] drm/vmwgfx: use core drm to extend/check vmw_execbuf_ioctl
Daniel Vetter
daniel at ffwll.ch
Fri May 24 07:46:28 UTC 2019
On Fri, May 24, 2019 at 8:05 AM Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom at vmware.com> wrote:
>
> On Wed, 2019-05-22 at 21:09 +0200, Daniel Vetter wrote:
> > On Wed, May 22, 2019 at 9:01 PM Thomas Hellstrom <
> > thellstrom at vmware.com> wrote:
> > > Hi, Emil,
> > >
> > > On Wed, 2019-05-22 at 17:41 +0100, Emil Velikov wrote:
> > > > From: Emil Velikov <emil.velikov at collabora.com>
> > > >
> > > > Currently vmw_execbuf_ioctl() open-codes the permission checking,
> > > > size
> > > > extending and copying that is already done in core drm.
> > > >
> > > > Kill all the duplication, adding a few comments for clarity.
> > >
> > > Ah, there is core functionality for this now.
> > >
> > > What worries me though with the core approach is that the sizes are
> > > not
> > > capped by the size of the kernel argument definition, which makes
> > > mailicious user-space being able to force kmallocs() the size of
> > > the
> > > maximum ioctl size. Should probably be fixed before pushing this.
> >
> > Hm I always worked under the assumption that kmalloc and friends
> > should be userspace hardened. Otherwise stuff like kmalloc_array
> > doesn't make any sense, everyone just feeds it unchecked input and
> > expects that helper to handle overflows.
> >
> > If we assume kmalloc isn't hardened against that, then we have a much
> > bigger problem than just vmwgfx ioctls ...
>
> After checking the drm_ioctl code I realize that what I thought was new
> behaviour actually has been around for a couple of years, so
> fixing isn't really tied to this patch series...
>
> What caused me to react was that previously we used to have this
>
> e4fda9f264e1 ("drm: Perform ioctl command validation on the stored
> kernel values")
>
> and we seem to have lost that now, if not for the io flags then at
> least for the size part. For the size of the ioctl arguments, I think
> in general if the kernel only touches a subset of the user-space
> specified size I see no reason why we should malloc / copy more than
> that?
I guess we could optimize that, but we'd probably still need to zero
clear the added size for forward compat with newer userspace. Iirc
we've had some issues in this area.
> Now, given the fact that the maximum ioctl argument size is quite
> limited, that might not be a big problem or a problem at all. Otherwise
> it would be pretty easy for a malicious process to allocate most or all
> of a system's resident memory?
The biggest you can allocate from kmalloc is limited by the largest
contiguous chunk alloc_pages gives you, which is limited by MAX_ORDER
from the page buddy allocator. You need lots of process to be able to
exhaust memory like that (and like I said, the entire kernel would be
broken if we'd consider this a security issue). If you want to make
sure that a process group can't exhaust memory this way then you need
to set appropriate cgroups limits.
-Daniel
>
> /Thomas
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > -Daniel
> >
> > >
> > > > Cc: "VMware Graphics" <linux-graphics-maintainer at vmware.com>
> > > > Cc: Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom at vmware.com>
> > > > Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel at ffwll.ch>
> > > > Signed-off-by: Emil Velikov <emil.velikov at collabora.com>
> > > > ---
> > > > Thomas, VMware team,
> > > >
> > > > Please give this some testing on your end. I've only tested it
> > > > against
> > > > mesa-master.
> > >
> > > I'll review tomorrow and do some testing. Need to see if I can dig
> > > up
> > > user-space apps with version 0...
> > >
> > > Thanks,
> > >
> > > Thomas
> > >
> > > > Thanks
> > > > Emil
> > > > ---
> > > > drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_drv.c | 12 +-----
> > > > drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_drv.h | 4 +-
> > > > drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c | 52 +++++++++--------
> > > > ----
> > > > ----
> > > > 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)
> > > >
> > > > diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_drv.c
> > > > b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_drv.c
> > > > index d3f108f7e52d..2cb6ae219e43 100644
> > > > --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_drv.c
> > > > +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_drv.c
> > > > @@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ static const struct drm_ioctl_desc
> > > > vmw_ioctls[] =
> > > > {
> > > > DRM_RENDER_ALLOW),
> > > > VMW_IOCTL_DEF(VMW_REF_SURFACE, vmw_surface_reference_ioctl,
> > > > DRM_AUTH | DRM_RENDER_ALLOW),
> > > > - VMW_IOCTL_DEF(VMW_EXECBUF, NULL, DRM_AUTH |
> > > > + VMW_IOCTL_DEF(VMW_EXECBUF, vmw_execbuf_ioctl, DRM_AUTH |
> > > > DRM_RENDER_ALLOW),
> > > > VMW_IOCTL_DEF(VMW_FENCE_WAIT, vmw_fence_obj_wait_ioctl,
> > > > DRM_RENDER_ALLOW),
> > > > @@ -1140,15 +1140,7 @@ static long vmw_generic_ioctl(struct file
> > > > *filp, unsigned int cmd,
> > > > &vmw_ioctls[nr - DRM_COMMAND_BASE];
> > > >
> > > > if (nr == DRM_COMMAND_BASE + DRM_VMW_EXECBUF) {
> > > > - ret = (long) drm_ioctl_permit(ioctl->flags,
> > > > file_priv);
> > > > - if (unlikely(ret != 0))
> > > > - return ret;
> > > > -
> > > > - if (unlikely((cmd & (IOC_IN | IOC_OUT)) !=
> > > > IOC_IN))
> > > > - goto out_io_encoding;
> > > > -
> > > > - return (long) vmw_execbuf_ioctl(dev, arg,
> > > > file_priv,
> > > > - _IOC_SIZE(c
> > > > md))
> > > > ;
> > > > + return ioctl_func(filp, cmd, arg);
> > > > } else if (nr == DRM_COMMAND_BASE +
> > > > DRM_VMW_UPDATE_LAYOUT) {
> > > > if (!drm_is_current_master(file_priv) &&
> > > > !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> > > > diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_drv.h
> > > > b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_drv.h
> > > > index 9be2176cc260..f5bfac85f793 100644
> > > > --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_drv.h
> > > > +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_drv.h
> > > > @@ -910,8 +910,8 @@ static inline struct page
> > > > *vmw_piter_page(struct
> > > > vmw_piter *viter)
> > > > * Command submission - vmwgfx_execbuf.c
> > > > */
> > > >
> > > > -extern int vmw_execbuf_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, unsigned
> > > > long
> > > > data,
> > > > - struct drm_file *file_priv, size_t
> > > > size);
> > > > +extern int vmw_execbuf_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,
> > > > + struct drm_file *file_priv);
> > > > extern int vmw_execbuf_process(struct drm_file *file_priv,
> > > > struct vmw_private *dev_priv,
> > > > void __user *user_commands,
> > > > diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c
> > > > b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c
> > > > index 2ff7ba04d8c8..767e2b99618d 100644
> > > > --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c
> > > > +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c
> > > > @@ -3977,54 +3977,40 @@ void vmw_execbuf_release_pinned_bo(struct
> > > > vmw_private *dev_priv)
> > > > mutex_unlock(&dev_priv->cmdbuf_mutex);
> > > > }
> > > >
> > > > -int vmw_execbuf_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, unsigned long
> > > > data,
> > > > - struct drm_file *file_priv, size_t size)
> > > > +int vmw_execbuf_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,
> > > > + struct drm_file *file_priv)
> > > > {
> > > > struct vmw_private *dev_priv = vmw_priv(dev);
> > > > - struct drm_vmw_execbuf_arg arg;
> > > > + struct drm_vmw_execbuf_arg *arg = data;
> > > > int ret;
> > > > - static const size_t copy_offset[] = {
> > > > - offsetof(struct drm_vmw_execbuf_arg,
> > > > context_handle),
> > > > - sizeof(struct drm_vmw_execbuf_arg)};
> > > > struct dma_fence *in_fence = NULL;
> > > >
> > > > - if (unlikely(size < copy_offset[0])) {
> > > > - VMW_DEBUG_USER("Invalid command size, ioctl %d\n",
> > > > - DRM_VMW_EXECBUF);
> > > > - return -EINVAL;
> > > > - }
> > > > -
> > > > - if (copy_from_user(&arg, (void __user *) data,
> > > > copy_offset[0])
> > > > != 0)
> > > > - return -EFAULT;
> > > > -
> > > > /*
> > > > * Extend the ioctl argument while maintaining backwards
> > > > compatibility:
> > > > - * We take different code paths depending on the value of
> > > > arg.version.
> > > > + * We take different code paths depending on the value of
> > > > arg-
> > > > > version.
> > > > + *
> > > > + * Note: The ioctl argument is extended and zeropadded by
> > > > core
> > > > DRM.
> > > > */
> > > > - if (unlikely(arg.version > DRM_VMW_EXECBUF_VERSION ||
> > > > - arg.version == 0)) {
> > > > + if (unlikely(arg->version > DRM_VMW_EXECBUF_VERSION ||
> > > > + arg->version == 0)) {
> > > > VMW_DEBUG_USER("Incorrect execbuf version.\n");
> > > > return -EINVAL;
> > > > }
> > > >
> > > > - if (arg.version > 1 &&
> > > > - copy_from_user(&arg.context_handle,
> > > > - (void __user *) (data + copy_offset[0]),
> > > > - copy_offset[arg.version - 1] -
> > > > copy_offset[0]) != 0)
> > > > - return -EFAULT;
> > > > -
> > > > - switch (arg.version) {
> > > > + switch (arg->version) {
> > > > case 1:
> > > > - arg.context_handle = (uint32_t) -1;
> > > > + /* For v1 core DRM have extended + zeropadded the
> > > > data
> > > > */
> > > > + arg->context_handle = (uint32_t) -1;
> > > > break;
> > > > case 2:
> > > > default:
> > > > + /* For v2 and later core DRM would have correctly
> > > > copied it */
> > > > break;
> > > > }
> > > >
> > > > /* If imported a fence FD from elsewhere, then wait on it
> > > > */
> > > > - if (arg.flags & DRM_VMW_EXECBUF_FLAG_IMPORT_FENCE_FD) {
> > > > - in_fence =
> > > > sync_file_get_fence(arg.imported_fence_fd);
> > > > + if (arg->flags & DRM_VMW_EXECBUF_FLAG_IMPORT_FENCE_FD) {
> > > > + in_fence = sync_file_get_fence(arg-
> > > > >imported_fence_fd);
> > > >
> > > > if (!in_fence) {
> > > > VMW_DEBUG_USER("Cannot get imported
> > > > fence\n");
> > > > @@ -4041,11 +4027,11 @@ int vmw_execbuf_ioctl(struct drm_device
> > > > *dev,
> > > > unsigned long data,
> > > > return ret;
> > > >
> > > > ret = vmw_execbuf_process(file_priv, dev_priv,
> > > > - (void __user *)(unsigned
> > > > long)arg.commands,
> > > > - NULL, arg.command_size,
> > > > arg.throttle_us,
> > > > - arg.context_handle,
> > > > - (void __user *)(unsigned
> > > > long)arg.fence_rep,
> > > > - NULL, arg.flags);
> > > > + (void __user *)(unsigned
> > > > long)arg-
> > > > > commands,
> > > > + NULL, arg->command_size, arg-
> > > > > throttle_us,
> > > > + arg->context_handle,
> > > > + (void __user *)(unsigned
> > > > long)arg-
> > > > > fence_rep,
> > > > + NULL, arg->flags);
> > > >
> > > > ttm_read_unlock(&dev_priv->reservation_sem);
> > > > if (unlikely(ret != 0))
> >
> >
--
Daniel Vetter
Software Engineer, Intel Corporation
+41 (0) 79 365 57 48 - http://blog.ffwll.ch
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