[PATCH v2 3/4] drm/ttm, drm/vmwgfx: Correctly support support AMD memory encryption
dave.hansen at intel.com
Tue Sep 3 20:51:28 UTC 2019
On 9/3/19 1:36 PM, Thomas Hellström (VMware) wrote:
> So the question here should really be, can we determine already at mmap
> time whether backing memory will be unencrypted and adjust the *real*
> vma->vm_page_prot under the mmap_sem?
> Possibly, but that requires populating the buffer with memory at mmap
> time rather than at first fault time.
I'm not connecting the dots.
vma->vm_page_prot is used to create a VMA's PTEs regardless of if they
are created at mmap() or fault time. If we establish a good
vma->vm_page_prot, can't we just use it forever for demand faults?
Or, are you concerned that if an attempt is made to demand-fault page
that's incompatible with vma->vm_page_prot that we have to SEGV?
> And it still requires knowledge whether the device DMA is always
> unencrypted (or if SEV is active).
I may be getting mixed up on MKTME (the Intel memory encryption) and
SEV. Is SEV supported on all memory types? Page cache, hugetlbfs,
anonymous? Or just anonymous?
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