[PATCH 11/13] mm: add unsafe_follow_pfn

[Jason Gunthorpe]

On Wed, Oct 07, 2020 at 08:10:34PM +0200, Daniel Vetter wrote:
> On Wed, Oct 7, 2020 at 7:36 PM Jason Gunthorpe <jgg at ziepe.ca> wrote:
> >
> > On Wed, Oct 07, 2020 at 06:44:24PM +0200, Daniel Vetter wrote:
> > > Way back it was a reasonable assumptions that iomem mappings never
> > > change the pfn range they point at. But this has changed:
> > >
> > > - gpu drivers dynamically manage their memory nowadays, invalidating
> > > ptes with unmap_mapping_range when buffers get moved
> > >
> > > - contiguous dma allocations have moved from dedicated carvetouts to
> > > cma regions. This means if we miss the unmap the pfn might contain
> > > pagecache or anon memory (well anything allocated with GFP_MOVEABLE)
> > >
> > > - even /dev/mem now invalidates mappings when the kernel requests that
> > > iomem region when CONFIG_IO_STRICT_DEVMEM is set, see 3234ac664a87
> > > ("/dev/mem: Revoke mappings when a driver claims the region")
> > >
> > > Accessing pfns obtained from ptes without holding all the locks is
> > > therefore no longer a good idea.
> > >
> > > Unfortunately there's some users where this is not fixable (like v4l
> > > userptr of iomem mappings) or involves a pile of work (vfio type1
> > > iommu). For now annotate these as unsafe and splat appropriately.
> > >
> > > This patch adds an unsafe_follow_pfn, which later patches will then
> > > roll out to all appropriate places.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter at intel.com>
> > > Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg at ziepe.ca>
> > > Cc: Kees Cook <keescook at chromium.org>
> > > Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams at intel.com>
> > > Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm at linux-foundation.org>
> > > Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard at nvidia.com>
> > > Cc: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse at redhat.com>
> > > Cc: Jan Kara <jack at suse.cz>
> > > Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams at intel.com>
> > > Cc: linux-mm at kvack.org
> > > Cc: linux-arm-kernel at lists.infradead.org
> > > Cc: linux-samsung-soc at vger.kernel.org
> > > Cc: linux-media at vger.kernel.org
> > > Cc: kvm at vger.kernel.org
> > >  include/linux/mm.h |  2 ++
> > >  mm/memory.c        | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> > >  mm/nommu.c         | 17 +++++++++++++++++
> > >  security/Kconfig   | 13 +++++++++++++
> > >  4 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > Makes sense to me.
> >
> > I wonder if we could change the original follow_pfn to require the
> > ptep and then lockdep_assert_held() it against the page table lock?
> 
> The safe variant with the pagetable lock is follow_pte_pmd. The only
> way to make follow_pfn safe is if you have an mmu notifier and
> corresponding retry logic. That is not covered by lockdep (it would
> splat if we annotate the retry side), so I'm not sure how you'd check
> for that?

Right OK.

> Checking for ptep lock doesn't work here, since the one leftover safe
> user of this (kvm) doesn't need that at all, because it has the mmu
> notifier.

Ah, so a better name and/or function kdoc for follow_pfn is probably a
good iead in this patch as well.

> So I think we're as good as it gets, since I really have no idea how
> to make sure follow_pfn callers do have an mmu notifier registered.

Yah, can't be done. Most mmu notifier users should be using
hmm_range_fault anyhow, kvm is really very special here.
 
> I've followed the few other CONFIG_STRICT_FOO I've seen, which are all
> explicit enables and default to "do not break uapi, damn the
> (security) bugs". Which is I think how this should be done. It is in
> the security section though, so hopefully competent distros will
> enable this all.

I thought the strict ones were more general and less clear security
worries, not bugs like this.

This is "allow a user triggerable use after free bug to exist in the
kernel"

Jason