[PATCH 0/3] Prevent out-of-bounds access for built-in font data buffers

[David Laight]

> On Thu, Sep 24, 2020 at 09:38:22AM -0400, Peilin Ye wrote:
> > Hi all,
> >
> > syzbot has reported [1] a global out-of-bounds read issue in
> > fbcon_get_font(). A malicious user may resize `vc_font.height` to a large
> > value in vt_ioctl(), causing fbcon_get_font() to overflow our built-in
> > font data buffers, declared in lib/fonts/font_*.c:
...
> > (drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c)
> >  	if (font->width <= 8) {
> >  		j = vc->vc_font.height;
> > +		if (font->charcount * j > FNTSIZE(fontdata))
> > +			return -EINVAL;

Can that still go wrong because the multiply wraps?

	David

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