[PATCH 5/9] dma-buf: heaps: mtk_sec_heap: Initialise tee session

Thu Sep 28 17:48:15 UTC 2023

On Thu, Sep 28, 2023 at 1:30 AM Benjamin Gaignard
<benjamin.gaignard at collabora.com> wrote:
>
>
> Le 27/09/2023 à 20:56, Jeffrey Kardatzke a écrit :
> > On Wed, Sep 27, 2023 at 8:18 AM Benjamin Gaignard
> > <benjamin.gaignard at collabora.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> Le 27/09/2023 à 15:46, Joakim Bech a écrit :
> >>> On Mon, Sep 25, 2023 at 12:49:50PM +0000, Yong Wu (吴勇) wrote:
> >>>> On Tue, 2023-09-12 at 11:32 +0200, AngeloGioacchino Del Regno wrote:
> >>>>> Il 12/09/23 08:17, Yong Wu (吴勇) ha scritto:
> >>>>>> On Mon, 2023-09-11 at 11:29 +0200, AngeloGioacchino Del Regno
> >>>>>> wrote:
> >>>>>>> Il 11/09/23 04:30, Yong Wu ha scritto:
> >>>>>>>> The TEE probe later than dma-buf heap, and PROBE_DEDER doesn't
> >>>>>>>> work
> >>>>>>>> here since this is not a platform driver, therefore initialise
> >>>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>> TEE
> >>>>>>>> context/session while we allocate the first secure buffer.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Yong Wu <yong.wu at mediatek.com>
> >>>>>>>> ---
> >>>>>>>>      drivers/dma-buf/heaps/mtk_secure_heap.c | 61
> >>>>>>>> +++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >>>>>>>>      1 file changed, 61 insertions(+)
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> diff --git a/drivers/dma-buf/heaps/mtk_secure_heap.c
> >>>>>>>> b/drivers/dma-
> >>>>>>>> buf/heaps/mtk_secure_heap.c
> >>>>>>>> index bbf1c8dce23e..e3da33a3d083 100644
> >>>>>>>> --- a/drivers/dma-buf/heaps/mtk_secure_heap.c
> >>>>>>>> +++ b/drivers/dma-buf/heaps/mtk_secure_heap.c
> >>>>>>>> @@ -10,6 +10,12 @@
> >>>>>>>>      #include <linux/err.h>
> >>>>>>>>      #include <linux/module.h>
> >>>>>>>>      #include <linux/slab.h>
> >>>>>>>> +#include <linux/tee_drv.h>
> >>>>>>>> +#include <linux/uuid.h>
> >>>>>>>> +
> >>>>>>>> +#define TZ_TA_MEM_UUID          "4477588a-8476-11e2-ad15-
> >>>>>>>> e41f1390d676"
> >>>>>>>> +
> >>>>>>> Is this UUID the same for all SoCs and all TZ versions?
> >>>>>> Yes. It is the same for all SoCs and all TZ versions currently.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>> That's good news!
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Is this UUID used in any userspace component? (example: Android
> >>>>> HALs?)
> >>>> No. Userspace never use it. If userspace would like to allocate this
> >>>> secure buffer, it can achieve through the existing dmabuf IOCTL via
> >>>> /dev/dma_heap/mtk_svp node.
> >>>>
> >>> In general I think as mentioned elsewhere in comments, that there isn't
> >>> that much here that seems to be unique for MediaTek in this patch
> >>> series, so I think it worth to see whether this whole patch set can be
> >>> made more generic. Having said that, the UUID is always unique for a
> >>> certain Trusted Application. So, it's not entirely true saying that the
> >>> UUID is the same for all SoCs and all TrustZone versions. It might be
> >>> true for a family of MediaTek devices and the TEE in use, but not
> >>> generically.
> >>>
> >>> So, if we need to differentiate between different TA implementations,
> >>> then we need different UUIDs. If it would be possible to make this patch
> >>> set generic, then it sounds like a single UUID would be sufficient, but
> >>> that would imply that all TA's supporting such a generic UUID would be
> >>> implemented the same from an API point of view. Which also means that
> >>> for example Trusted Application function ID's needs to be the same etc.
> >>> Not impossible to achieve, but still not easy (different TEE follows
> >>> different specifications) and it's not typically something we've done in
> >>> the past.
> >>>
> >>> Unfortunately there is no standardized database of TA's describing what
> >>> they implement and support.
> >>>
> >>> As an alternative, we could implement a query call in the TEE answering,
> >>> "What UUID does your TA have that implements secure unmapped heap?".
> >>> I.e., something that reminds of a lookup table. Then we wouldn't have to
> >>> carry this in UAPI, DT or anywhere else.
> >> Joakim does a TA could offer a generic API and hide the hardware specific
> >> details (like kernel uAPI does for drivers) ?
> > It would have to go through another layer (like the tee driver) to be
> > a generic API. The main issue with TAs is that they have UUIDs you
> > need to connect to and specific codes for each function; so we should
> > abstract at a layer above where those exist in the dma-heap code.
> >> Aside that question I wonder what are the needs to perform a 'secure' playback.
> >> I have in mind 2 requirements:
> >> - secure memory regions, which means configure the hardware to ensure that only
> >> dedicated hardware blocks and read or write into it.
> >> - set hardware blocks in secure modes so they access to secure memory.
> >> Do you see something else ?
> > This is more or less what is required, but this is out of scope for
> > the Linux kernel since it can't be trusted to do these things...this
> > is all done in firmware or the TEE itself.
>
> Yes kernel can't be trusted to do these things but know what we need could help
> to define a API for a generic TA.
>
> Just to brainstorm on mailing list:
> What about a TA API like
> TA_secure_memory_region() and TA_unsecure_memory_region() with parameters like:
> - device identifier (an ID or compatible string maybe)
> - memory region (physical address, size, offset)
> - requested access rights (read, write)
>
> and on kernel side a IOMMU driver because it basically have all this information already
> (device attachment, kernel map/unmap).
>
> In my mind it sound like a solution to limit the impact (new controls, new memory type)
> inside v4l2. Probably we won't need new heap either.
> All hardware dedicated implementations could live inside the TA which can offer a generic
> API.

The main problem with that type of design is the limitations of
TrustZone memory protection. Usually there is a limit to the number of
regions you can define for memory protection (and there is on
Mediatek). So you can't pass an arbitrary memory region and mark it
protected/unprotected at a given time. You need to establish these
regions in the firmware instead and then configure those regions for
protection in the firmware or the TEE.

>
> >> Regards,
> >> Benjamin
> >>