[PATCH 01/24] perf/core: Only copy-to-user after completely unlocking all locks, v3.
Maarten Lankhorst
dev at mblankhorst.nl
Fri Apr 17 13:55:08 UTC 2020
From: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst at linux.intel.com>
We inadvertently create a dependency on mmap_sem with a whole chain.
This breaks any user who wants to take a lock and call rcu_barrier(),
while also taking that lock inside mmap_sem:
<4> [604.892532] ======================================================
<4> [604.892534] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
<4> [604.892536] 5.6.0-rc7-CI-Patchwork_17096+ #1 Tainted: G U
<4> [604.892537] ------------------------------------------------------
<4> [604.892538] kms_frontbuffer/2595 is trying to acquire lock:
<4> [604.892540] ffffffff8264a558 (rcu_state.barrier_mutex){+.+.}, at: rcu_barrier+0x23/0x190
<4> [604.892547]
but task is already holding lock:
<4> [604.892547] ffff888484716050 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}, at: i915_gem_object_pin_to_display_plane+0x89/0x270 [i915]
<4> [604.892592]
which lock already depends on the new lock.
<4> [604.892593]
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
<4> [604.892594]
-> #6 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}:
<4> [604.892597] __ww_mutex_lock.constprop.15+0xc3/0x1090
<4> [604.892598] ww_mutex_lock+0x39/0x70
<4> [604.892600] dma_resv_lockdep+0x10e/0x1f5
<4> [604.892602] do_one_initcall+0x58/0x300
<4> [604.892604] kernel_init_freeable+0x17b/0x1dc
<4> [604.892605] kernel_init+0x5/0x100
<4> [604.892606] ret_from_fork+0x24/0x50
<4> [604.892607]
-> #5 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}:
<4> [604.892609] dma_resv_lockdep+0xec/0x1f5
<4> [604.892610] do_one_initcall+0x58/0x300
<4> [604.892610] kernel_init_freeable+0x17b/0x1dc
<4> [604.892611] kernel_init+0x5/0x100
<4> [604.892612] ret_from_fork+0x24/0x50
<4> [604.892613]
-> #4 (&mm->mmap_sem#2){++++}:
<4> [604.892615] __might_fault+0x63/0x90
<4> [604.892617] _copy_to_user+0x1e/0x80
<4> [604.892619] perf_read+0x200/0x2b0
<4> [604.892621] vfs_read+0x96/0x160
<4> [604.892622] ksys_read+0x9f/0xe0
<4> [604.892623] do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x220
<4> [604.892624] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
<4> [604.892625]
-> #3 (&cpuctx_mutex){+.+.}:
<4> [604.892626] __mutex_lock+0x9a/0x9c0
<4> [604.892627] perf_event_init_cpu+0xa4/0x140
<4> [604.892629] perf_event_init+0x19d/0x1cd
<4> [604.892630] start_kernel+0x362/0x4e4
<4> [604.892631] secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0
<4> [604.892631]
-> #2 (pmus_lock){+.+.}:
<4> [604.892633] __mutex_lock+0x9a/0x9c0
<4> [604.892633] perf_event_init_cpu+0x6b/0x140
<4> [604.892635] cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x9b/0x9d0
<4> [604.892636] _cpu_up+0xa2/0x140
<4> [604.892637] do_cpu_up+0x61/0xa0
<4> [604.892639] smp_init+0x57/0x96
<4> [604.892639] kernel_init_freeable+0x87/0x1dc
<4> [604.892640] kernel_init+0x5/0x100
<4> [604.892642] ret_from_fork+0x24/0x50
<4> [604.892642]
-> #1 (cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem){++++}:
<4> [604.892643] cpus_read_lock+0x34/0xd0
<4> [604.892644] rcu_barrier+0xaa/0x190
<4> [604.892645] kernel_init+0x21/0x100
<4> [604.892647] ret_from_fork+0x24/0x50
<4> [604.892647]
-> #0 (rcu_state.barrier_mutex){+.+.}:
<4> [604.892649] __lock_acquire+0x1328/0x15d0
<4> [604.892650] lock_acquire+0xa7/0x1c0
<4> [604.892651] __mutex_lock+0x9a/0x9c0
<4> [604.892652] rcu_barrier+0x23/0x190
<4> [604.892680] i915_gem_object_unbind+0x29d/0x3f0 [i915]
<4> [604.892707] i915_gem_object_pin_to_display_plane+0x141/0x270 [i915]
<4> [604.892737] intel_pin_and_fence_fb_obj+0xec/0x1f0 [i915]
<4> [604.892767] intel_plane_pin_fb+0x3f/0xd0 [i915]
<4> [604.892797] intel_prepare_plane_fb+0x13b/0x5c0 [i915]
<4> [604.892798] drm_atomic_helper_prepare_planes+0x85/0x110
<4> [604.892827] intel_atomic_commit+0xda/0x390 [i915]
<4> [604.892828] drm_atomic_helper_set_config+0x57/0xa0
<4> [604.892830] drm_mode_setcrtc+0x1c4/0x720
<4> [604.892830] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xb0/0xf0
<4> [604.892831] drm_ioctl+0x2e1/0x390
<4> [604.892833] ksys_ioctl+0x7b/0x90
<4> [604.892835] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x11/0x20
<4> [604.892835] do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x220
<4> [604.892836] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
<4> [604.892837]
Changes since v1:
- Use (*values)[n++] in perf_read_one().
Changes since v2:
- Centrally allocate values.
Signed-off-by: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst at linux.intel.com>
fixup perf patch
Signed-off-by: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst at linux.intel.com>
---
kernel/events/core.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index c8f65daee1f9..b33b99fceecb 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -5102,20 +5102,16 @@ static int __perf_read_group_add(struct perf_event *leader,
}
static int perf_read_group(struct perf_event *event,
- u64 read_format, char __user *buf)
+ u64 read_format, char __user *buf,
+ u64 *values)
{
struct perf_event *leader = event->group_leader, *child;
struct perf_event_context *ctx = leader->ctx;
int ret;
- u64 *values;
lockdep_assert_held(&ctx->mutex);
- values = kzalloc(event->read_size, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!values)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- values[0] = 1 + leader->nr_siblings;
+ *values = 1 + leader->nr_siblings;
/*
* By locking the child_mutex of the leader we effectively
@@ -5133,25 +5129,17 @@ static int perf_read_group(struct perf_event *event,
goto unlock;
}
- mutex_unlock(&leader->child_mutex);
-
ret = event->read_size;
- if (copy_to_user(buf, values, event->read_size))
- ret = -EFAULT;
- goto out;
-
unlock:
mutex_unlock(&leader->child_mutex);
-out:
- kfree(values);
return ret;
}
static int perf_read_one(struct perf_event *event,
- u64 read_format, char __user *buf)
+ u64 read_format, char __user *buf,
+ u64 *values)
{
u64 enabled, running;
- u64 values[4];
int n = 0;
values[n++] = __perf_event_read_value(event, &enabled, &running);
@@ -5162,9 +5150,6 @@ static int perf_read_one(struct perf_event *event,
if (read_format & PERF_FORMAT_ID)
values[n++] = primary_event_id(event);
- if (copy_to_user(buf, values, n * sizeof(u64)))
- return -EFAULT;
-
return n * sizeof(u64);
}
@@ -5185,7 +5170,8 @@ static bool is_event_hup(struct perf_event *event)
* Read the performance event - simple non blocking version for now
*/
static ssize_t
-__perf_read(struct perf_event *event, char __user *buf, size_t count)
+__perf_read(struct perf_event *event, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, u64 *values)
{
u64 read_format = event->attr.read_format;
int ret;
@@ -5203,9 +5189,9 @@ __perf_read(struct perf_event *event, char __user *buf, size_t count)
WARN_ON_ONCE(event->ctx->parent_ctx);
if (read_format & PERF_FORMAT_GROUP)
- ret = perf_read_group(event, read_format, buf);
+ ret = perf_read_group(event, read_format, buf, values);
else
- ret = perf_read_one(event, read_format, buf);
+ ret = perf_read_one(event, read_format, buf, values);
return ret;
}
@@ -5215,6 +5201,7 @@ perf_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct perf_event *event = file->private_data;
struct perf_event_context *ctx;
+ u64 *values;
int ret;
ret = security_perf_event_read(event);
@@ -5222,9 +5209,19 @@ perf_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
return ret;
ctx = perf_event_ctx_lock(event);
- ret = __perf_read(event, buf, count);
+ values = kzalloc(event->read_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (values)
+ ret = __perf_read(event, buf, count, values);
+ else
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
perf_event_ctx_unlock(event, ctx);
+ if (ret > 0) {
+ if (copy_to_user(buf, values, ret))
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ }
+ kfree(values);
+
return ret;
}
--
2.25.1
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