[Intel-gfx] [PATCH v8 00/12] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability

[Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo]

Em Tue, Jul 14, 2020 at 12:59:34PM +0200, Peter Zijlstra escreveu:
> On Mon, Jul 13, 2020 at 03:51:52PM -0300, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo wrote:
> 
> > > > diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
> > > > index 856d98c36f56..a2397f724c10 100644
> > > > --- a/kernel/events/core.c
> > > > +++ b/kernel/events/core.c
> > > > @@ -11595,7 +11595,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
> > > >  		 * perf_event_exit_task() that could imply).
> > > >  		 */
> > > >  		err = -EACCES;
> > > > -		if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
> > > > +		if (!perfmon_capable() && !ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
> > > >  			goto err_cred;
> > > >  	}

> > > >> makes monitoring simpler and even more secure to use since Perf tool need
> > > >> not to start/stop/single-step and read/write registers and memory and so on
> > > >> like a debugger or strace-like tool. What do you think?

> > > > I tend to agree, Peter?

> So this basically says that if CAP_PERFMON, we don't care about the
> ptrace() permissions? Just like how CAP_SYS_PTRACE would always allow
> the ptrace checks?

> I suppose that makes sense.

Yeah, it in fact addresses the comment right above it:

        if (task) {
                err = mutex_lock_interruptible(&task->signal->exec_update_mutex);
                if (err)
                        goto err_task;

                /*
                 * Reuse ptrace permission checks for now.
                 *
                 * We must hold exec_update_mutex across this and any potential
                 * perf_install_in_context() call for this new event to
                 * serialize against exec() altering our credentials (and the
                 * perf_event_exit_task() that could imply).
                 */
                err = -EACCES;
                if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
                        goto err_cred;
        }


that "for now" part :-)

Idea is to not require CAP_PTRACE for that, i.e. the attack surface for the
perf binary is reduced.

- Arnaldo