[Intel-gfx] [PATCH v5 09/19] vfio/pci: Allow passing zero-length fd array in VFIO_DEVICE_PCI_HOT_RESET

[Alex Williamson]

On Thu, 2 Mar 2023 06:07:04 +0000
"Liu, Yi L" <yi.l.liu at intel.com> wrote:

> > From: Liu, Yi L <yi.l.liu at intel.com>
> > Sent: Monday, February 27, 2023 7:11 PM  
> [...]
> > @@ -2392,13 +2416,25 @@ static int
> > vfio_pci_dev_set_pm_runtime_get(struct vfio_device_set *dev_set)
> >  	return ret;
> >  }
> > 
> > +static bool vfio_dev_in_iommufd_ctx(struct vfio_pci_core_device *vdev,
> > +				    struct iommufd_ctx *iommufd_ctx)
> > +{
> > +	struct iommufd_ctx *iommufd = vfio_device_iommufd(&vdev-  
> > >vdev);  
> > +
> > +	if (!iommufd)
> > +		return false;
> > +
> > +	return iommufd == iommufd_ctx;
> > +}
> > +
> >  /*
> >   * We need to get memory_lock for each device, but devices can share
> > mmap_lock,
> >   * therefore we need to zap and hold the vma_lock for each device, and
> > only then
> >   * get each memory_lock.
> >   */
> >  static int vfio_pci_dev_set_hot_reset(struct vfio_device_set *dev_set,
> > -				      struct vfio_pci_group_info *groups)
> > +				      struct vfio_pci_group_info *groups,
> > +				      struct iommufd_ctx *iommufd_ctx)
> >  {
> >  	struct vfio_pci_core_device *cur_mem;
> >  	struct vfio_pci_core_device *cur_vma;
> > @@ -2429,10 +2465,27 @@ static int vfio_pci_dev_set_hot_reset(struct
> > vfio_device_set *dev_set,
> > 
> >  	list_for_each_entry(cur_vma, &dev_set->device_list,
> > vdev.dev_set_list) {
> >  		/*
> > -		 * Test whether all the affected devices are contained by
> > the
> > -		 * set of groups provided by the user.
> > +		 * Test whether all the affected devices can be reset by the
> > +		 * user.  The affected devices may already been opened or
> > not
> > +		 * yet.
> > +		 *
> > +		 * For the devices not opened yet, user can reset them. The
> > +		 * reason is that the hot reset is done under the protection
> > +		 * of the dev_set->lock, and device open is also under this
> > +		 * lock.  During the hot reset, such devices can not be
> > opened
> > +		 * by other users.
> > +		 *
> > +		 * For the devices that have been opened, needs to check
> > the
> > +		 * ownership.  If the user provides a set of group fds, the
> > +		 * ownership check is done by checking if all the opened
> > +		 * devices are contained by the groups.  If the user provides
> > +		 * a zero-length fd array, the ownerhsip check is done by
> > +		 * checking if all the opened devices are bound to the same
> > +		 * iommufd_ctx.
> >  		 */
> > -		if (!vfio_dev_in_groups(cur_vma, groups)) {
> > +		if (cur_vma->vdev.open_count &&
> > +		    !vfio_dev_in_groups(cur_vma, groups) &&
> > +		    !vfio_dev_in_iommufd_ctx(cur_vma, iommufd_ctx)) {  
> 
> Hi Alex, Jason,
> 
> There is one concern on this approach which is related to the
> cdev noiommu mode. As patch 16 of this series, cdev path
> supports noiommu mode by passing a negative iommufd to
> kernel. In such case, the vfio_device is not bound to a valid
> iommufd. Then the check in vfio_dev_in_iommufd_ctx() is
> to be broken.
> 
> An idea is to add a cdev_noiommu flag in vfio_device, when
> checking the iommufd_ictx, also check this flag. If all the opened
> devices in the dev_set have vfio_device->cdev_noiommu==true,
> then the reset is considered to be doable. But there is a special
> case. If devices in this dev_set are opened by two applications
> that operates in cdev noiommu mode, then this logic is not able
> to differentiate them. In that case, should we allow the reset?
> It seems to ok to allow reset since noiommu mode itself means
> no security between the applications that use it. thoughts?

I don't think the existing vulnerabilities of no-iommu mode should be
carte blanche to add additional weaknesses.  Thanks,

Alex