[05/15] drm/xe: Introduce an xe_validation wrapper around drm_exec

[Thomas Hellström]

On Sun, 2025-08-17 at 16:05 +0200, Simon Richter wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> On Wed, Aug 13, 2025 at 12:51:11PM +0200, Thomas Hellström wrote:
> 
> > +static int xe_validation_lock(struct xe_validation_ctx *ctx)
> > +{
> > +	struct xe_validation_device *val = ctx->val;
> > +	int ret = 0;
> > +
> > +	if (ctx->flags & DRM_EXEC_INTERRUPTIBLE_WAIT) {
> > +		if (ctx->request_exclusive)
> > +			ret = down_write_killable(&val->lock);
> > +		else
> > +			ret = down_read_interruptible(&val->lock);
> > +	} else {
> > +		if (ctx->request_exclusive)
> > +			down_write(&val->lock);
> > +		else
> > +			down_read(&val->lock);
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	if (!ret) {
> > +		ctx->lock_held = true;
> > +		ctx->lock_held_exclusive = ctx->request_exclusive;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	return ret;
> > +}
> 
> This can fail if DRM_EXEC_INTERRUPTIBLE_WAIT is set, ...
> 
> > +int xe_validation_ctx_init(struct xe_validation_ctx *ctx, struct
> > xe_validation_device *val,
> > +			   struct drm_exec *exec, u32 flags,
> > unsigned int nr,
> > +			   bool exclusive)
> > +{
> > +	int ret;
> > +
> > +	ctx->exec = exec;
> > +	ctx->val = val;
> > +	ctx->lock_held = false;
> > +	ctx->lock_held_exclusive = false;
> > +	ctx->request_exclusive = exclusive;
> > +	ctx->flags = flags;
> > +	ctx->nr = nr;
> > +
> > +	ret = xe_validation_lock(ctx);
> > +	if (ret)
> > +		return ret;
> 
> ... causing an error to be returned here, which...
> 
> > +DEFINE_CLASS(xe_validation, struct xe_validation_ctx *,
> > +	     if (!IS_ERR(_T)) xe_validation_ctx_fini(_T);,
> > +	     ({_ret = xe_validation_ctx_init(_ctx, _val, _exec,
> > _flags, 0, _excl);
> > +	       _ret ? NULL : _ctx; }),
> > +	     struct xe_validation_ctx *_ctx, struct
> > xe_validation_device *_val,
> > +	     struct drm_exec *_exec, u32 _flags, int _ret, bool
> > _excl);
> 
> ... causes a NULL pointer to be recorded for the scoped guard here,
> which
> is then passed to xe_validation_ctx_fini on scope exit, causing
> 
> Kernel attempted to read user page (0) - exploit attempt? (uid: 1000)
> BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000000
> Faulting instruction address: 0xc008000014bcf2a8
> Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
> LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix  SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA PowerNV
> Modules linked in: xt_conntrack nft_chain_nat xt_MASQUERADE nf_nat
> nf_conntrack_netlink nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4
> xfrm_user xfrm_algo xt_addrtype nft_compat x_tables nf_tables
> nfnetlink br_netfilter bridge stp llc overlay binfmt_misc mei_gsc
> mei_me snd_hda_codec_intelhdmi mei snd_hda_codec_hdmi mtd_intel_dg xe
> joydev evdev drm_gpuvm drm_buddy gpu_sched drm_exec
> drm_suballoc_helper drm_ttm_helper ttm drm_display_helper hid_generic
> usbhid cec hid rc_core drm_client_lib drm_kms_helper snd_hda_intel
> snd_intel_dspcfg drm snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core aes_gcm_p10_crypto
> crypto_simd snd_hwdep cryptd xts snd_pcm drm_panel_orientation_quirks
> ghash_generic ofpart snd_timer vmx_crypto powernv_flash i2c_algo_bit
> snd ipmi_powernv gf128mul mtd ipmi_devintf configfs ipmi_msghandler
> opal_prd at24 soundcore regmap_i2c ext4 crc16 mbcache jbd2 dm_mod
> xhci_pci xhci_hcd nvme tg3 usbcore nvme_core libphy nvme_keyring
> nvme_auth mdio_bus usb_common
> CPU: 24 UID: 0 PID: 2438 Comm: Xorg Not tainted 6.17.0-rc1+ #1
> VOLUNTARY
> Hardware name: T2P9D01 REV 1.01 POWER9 0x4e1202 opal:skiboot-9858186
> PowerNV
> NIP:  c008000014bcf2a8 LR: c008000014bd5724 CTR: c0080000141a0248
> REGS: c00000000fa0f4a0 TRAP: 0300   Not tainted  (6.17.0-rc1+)
> MSR:  900000000280b033 <SF,HV,VEC,VSX,EE,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE>  CR:
> 88002844  XER: 00000
> 
> CFAR: c008000014bd5720 DAR: 0000000000000000 DSISR: 40000000 IRQMASK:
> 0
> GPR00: c008000014bd5724 c00000000fa0f740 c008000014df9200
> 0000000000000000
> GPR04: c000000023340000 c000000023340000 0000000000000031
> fffffffffffe0000
> GPR08: c00000002d0075a8 fffffffffffff000 0000000000000000
> c008000014d8d3b8
> GPR12: c0080000141a0248 c0000007fffcc800 0000000000000000
> 0000000000000000
> GPR16: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 0000000000000001
> c0002000084dff40
> GPR20: c000000019230308 fffffffffffff000 0000000000000000
> fffffffffffff000
> GPR24: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000001
> c0002000134ab000
> GPR28: 0000000000000000 c00020001333e818 0000000000000000
> 0000000000000000
> NIP [c008000014bcf2a8] xe_validation_ctx_fini+0x20/0x90 [xe]
> LR [c008000014bd5724] new_vma+0x32c/0x400 [xe]
> Call Trace:
> [c00000000fa0f740] [0000000000000001] 0x1 (unreliable)
> [c00000000fa0f770] [c008000014bd5724] new_vma+0x32c/0x400 [xe]
> [c00000000fa0f860] [c008000014bd5abc]
> vm_bind_ioctl_ops_parse+0x2c4/0x9b0 [xe]
> [c00000000fa0f920] [c008000014bd9dac] xe_vm_bind_ioctl+0x1344/0x17a0
> [xe]
> [c00000000fa0faf0] [c00800001349ca58] drm_ioctl_kernel+0x100/0x1a0
> [drm]
> [c00000000fa0fb50] [c00800001349cd88] drm_ioctl+0x290/0x690 [drm]
> [c00000000fa0fcc0] [c008000014b1fcdc] xe_drm_ioctl+0x74/0xd0 [xe]
> [c00000000fa0fd10] [c0000000006ec654] sys_ioctl+0x594/0x1020
> [c00000000fa0fe10] [c00000000002c020]
> system_call_exception+0x120/0x240
> [c00000000fa0fe50] [c00000000000cfdc]
> system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec

Right, that's been pointed out also by Matt Brost's review. 
The idea here is that if the interruptible lock returns -EINTR, then we
should not enter the code within xe_validation_guard() either so on top
of the fix for this, it looks like I need to mark it as conditional.

Thanks,
Thomas



> 
>    Simon