[Libreoffice-commits] core.git: Branch 'distro/collabora/cp-4.2' - external/openssl
Caolán McNamara
caolanm at redhat.com
Fri Oct 17 06:23:56 PDT 2014
external/openssl/CVE-2014-3505.patch | 52 +++
external/openssl/CVE-2014-3506.patch | 87 +++++
external/openssl/CVE-2014-3507.patch | 53 +++
external/openssl/CVE-2014-3508.patch | 138 ++++++++
external/openssl/CVE-2014-3509.patch | 45 ++
external/openssl/CVE-2014-3510.patch | 86 +++++
external/openssl/CVE-2014-3511.patch | 85 +++++
external/openssl/CVE-2014-3513.patch | 186 +++++++++++
external/openssl/CVE-2014-3566.patch | 466 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
external/openssl/CVE-2014-3567.patch | 14
external/openssl/UnpackedTarball_openssl.mk | 10
11 files changed, 1222 insertions(+)
New commits:
commit 2ae53ab6e6e8eee4384648ab8b40bba72ce746ba
Author: Caolán McNamara <caolanm at redhat.com>
Date: Fri Oct 17 11:07:59 2014 +0100
CVE-2014-3566 (etc)
i.e. sync with fedora 20 openssl-1.0.1e security backports
Change-Id: I9e07d3aad7f0c7a3fd684d4e52b3b952cfb2f82d
diff --git a/external/openssl/CVE-2014-3505.patch b/external/openssl/CVE-2014-3505.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..69284d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/external/openssl/CVE-2014-3505.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+From 2172d4f63c61922487008f42511cc6bdae9b47a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Adam Langley <agl at imperialviolet.org>
+Date: Fri, 6 Jun 2014 14:19:21 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Avoid double free when processing DTLS packets.
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+The |item| variable, in both of these cases, may contain a pointer to a
+|pitem| structure within |s->d1->buffered_messages|. It was being freed
+in the error case while still being in |buffered_messages|. When the
+error later caused the |SSL*| to be destroyed, the item would be double
+freed.
+
+Thanks to Wah-Teh Chang for spotting that the fix in 1632ef74 was
+inconsistent with the other error paths (but correct).
+
+Fixes CVE-2014-3505
+
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia at openssl.org>
+---
+ ssl/d1_both.c | 6 ++----
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c
+index c1eb970..cdb83b6 100644
+--- a/a/ssl/d1_both.c
++++ b/b/ssl/d1_both.c
+@@ -693,8 +693,7 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
+ return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
+
+ err:
+- if (frag != NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+- if (item != NULL) OPENSSL_free(item);
++ if (frag != NULL && item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+ *ok = 0;
+ return i;
+ }
+@@ -778,8 +777,7 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
+ return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
+
+ err:
+- if ( frag != NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+- if ( item != NULL) OPENSSL_free(item);
++ if (frag != NULL && item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+ *ok = 0;
+ return i;
+ }
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
diff --git a/external/openssl/CVE-2014-3506.patch b/external/openssl/CVE-2014-3506.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..45b87dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/external/openssl/CVE-2014-3506.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+From fc7804ec392fcf8051abe6bc9da9108744d2ae35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt at openssl.org>
+Date: Fri, 6 Jun 2014 14:25:52 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix DTLS handshake message size checks.
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+In |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, the value of
+|msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len| was being checked against the maximum
+handshake message size, but then |msg_len| bytes were allocated for the
+fragment buffer. This means that so long as the fragment was within the
+allowed size, the pending handshake message could consume 16MB + 2MB
+(for the reassembly bitmap). Approx 10 outstanding handshake messages
+are allowed, meaning that an attacker could consume ~180MB per DTLS
+connection.
+
+In the non-fragmented path (in |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message|), no
+check was applied.
+
+Fixes CVE-2014-3506
+
+Wholly based on patch by Adam Langley with one minor amendment.
+
+Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia at openssl.org>
+---
+ ssl/d1_both.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++-------------
+ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c
+index 6559dfc..b9e15df 100644
+--- a/a/ssl/d1_both.c
++++ b/b/ssl/d1_both.c
+@@ -587,6 +587,16 @@ dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, long max, int *ok)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
++/* dtls1_max_handshake_message_len returns the maximum number of bytes
++ * permitted in a DTLS handshake message for |s|. The minimum is 16KB, but may
++ * be greater if the maximum certificate list size requires it. */
++static unsigned long dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *s)
++ {
++ unsigned long max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
++ if (max_len < (unsigned long)s->max_cert_list)
++ return s->max_cert_list;
++ return max_len;
++ }
+
+ static int
+ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
+@@ -595,20 +605,10 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
+ pitem *item = NULL;
+ int i = -1, is_complete;
+ unsigned char seq64be[8];
+- unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len, max_len;
+-
+- if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len)
+- goto err;
+-
+- /* Determine maximum allowed message size. Depends on (user set)
+- * maximum certificate length, but 16k is minimum.
+- */
+- if (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH < s->max_cert_list)
+- max_len = s->max_cert_list;
+- else
+- max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
++ unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
+
+- if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > max_len)
++ if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len ||
++ msg_hdr->msg_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Try to find item in queue */
+@@ -749,6 +749,9 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
+ if (frag_len && frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len)
+ return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, msg_hdr, ok);
+
++ if (frag_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
++ goto err;
++
+ frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len, 0);
+ if ( frag == NULL)
+ goto err;
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
diff --git a/external/openssl/CVE-2014-3507.patch b/external/openssl/CVE-2014-3507.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4ea0b69
--- /dev/null
+++ b/external/openssl/CVE-2014-3507.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_both.c.dtls-memleak openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_both.c
+--- a/a/ssl/d1_both.c.dtls-memleak 2014-08-07 17:51:18.457493922 +0200
++++ b/b/ssl/d1_both.c 2014-08-07 17:58:28.478558785 +0200
+@@ -610,6 +610,9 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct
+ msg_hdr->msg_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
+ goto err;
+
++ if (frag_len == 0)
++ return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
++
+ /* Try to find item in queue */
+ memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
+ seq64be[6] = (unsigned char) (msg_hdr->seq>>8);
+@@ -686,7 +689,12 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct
+ i = -1;
+ }
+
+- pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
++ item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
++ /* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted.
++ * However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were,
++ * |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it and control
++ * would never have reached this branch. */
++ OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
+ }
+
+ return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
+@@ -744,7 +752,7 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s,
+ }
+ else
+ {
+- if (frag_len && frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len)
++ if (frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len)
+ return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, msg_hdr, ok);
+
+ if (frag_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
+@@ -773,7 +781,15 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s,
+ if ( item == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+- pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
++ item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
++ /* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted.
++ * However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were,
++ * |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it. Then, either
++ * |frag_len| != |msg_hdr->msg_len| in which case |item| is set
++ * to NULL and it will have been processed with
++ * |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, above, or the record will have
++ * been discarded. */
++ OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
+ }
+
+ return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
diff --git a/external/openssl/CVE-2014-3508.patch b/external/openssl/CVE-2014-3508.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..513608d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/external/openssl/CVE-2014-3508.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+From 03b04ddac162c7b7fa3c57eadccc5a583a00d291 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Emilia Kasper <emilia at openssl.org>
+Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2014 19:02:33 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix OID handling:
+
+- Upon parsing, reject OIDs with invalid base-128 encoding.
+- Always NUL-terminate the destination buffer in OBJ_obj2txt printing function.
+
+CVE-2014-3508
+
+Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt at openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh at openssl.org>
+---
+ crypto/asn1/a_object.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++---------
+ crypto/objects/obj_dat.c | 16 +++++++++-------
+ 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_object.c b/crypto/asn1/a_object.c
+index 3978c91..77b2768 100644
+--- a/a/crypto/asn1/a_object.c
++++ b/b/crypto/asn1/a_object.c
+@@ -283,17 +283,29 @@ err:
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_OBJECT,i);
+ return(NULL);
+ }
++
+ ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp,
+ long len)
+ {
+ ASN1_OBJECT *ret=NULL;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ unsigned char *data;
+- int i;
+- /* Sanity check OID encoding: can't have leading 0x80 in
+- * subidentifiers, see: X.690 8.19.2
++ int i, length;
++
++ /* Sanity check OID encoding.
++ * Need at least one content octet.
++ * MSB must be clear in the last octet.
++ * can't have leading 0x80 in subidentifiers, see: X.690 8.19.2
+ */
+- for (i = 0, p = *pp; i < len; i++, p++)
++ if (len <= 0 || len > INT_MAX || pp == NULL || (p = *pp) == NULL ||
++ p[len - 1] & 0x80)
++ {
++ ASN1err(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_OBJECT,ASN1_R_INVALID_OBJECT_ENCODING);
++ return NULL;
++ }
++ /* Now 0 < len <= INT_MAX, so the cast is safe. */
++ length = (int)len;
++ for (i = 0; i < length; i++, p++)
+ {
+ if (*p == 0x80 && (!i || !(p[-1] & 0x80)))
+ {
+@@ -316,23 +328,23 @@ ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp,
+ data = (unsigned char *)ret->data;
+ ret->data = NULL;
+ /* once detached we can change it */
+- if ((data == NULL) || (ret->length < len))
++ if ((data == NULL) || (ret->length < length))
+ {
+ ret->length=0;
+ if (data != NULL) OPENSSL_free(data);
+- data=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(len ? (int)len : 1);
++ data=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(length);
+ if (data == NULL)
+ { i=ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE; goto err; }
+ ret->flags|=ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA;
+ }
+- memcpy(data,p,(int)len);
++ memcpy(data,p,length);
+ /* reattach data to object, after which it remains const */
+ ret->data =data;
+- ret->length=(int)len;
++ ret->length=length;
+ ret->sn=NULL;
+ ret->ln=NULL;
+ /* ret->flags=ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC; we know it is dynamic */
+- p+=len;
++ p+=length;
+
+ if (a != NULL) (*a)=ret;
+ *pp=p;
+diff --git a/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c b/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
+index 8a342ba..0b2f442 100644
+--- a/a/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
++++ b/b/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
+@@ -471,11 +471,12 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name)
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ char tbuf[DECIMAL_SIZE(i)+DECIMAL_SIZE(l)+2];
+
+- if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL)) {
+- buf[0]='\0';
+- return(0);
+- }
++ /* Ensure that, at every state, |buf| is NUL-terminated. */
++ if (buf && buf_len > 0)
++ buf[0] = '\0';
+
++ if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL))
++ return(0);
+
+ if (!no_name && (nid=OBJ_obj2nid(a)) != NID_undef)
+ {
+@@ -554,9 +555,10 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name)
+ i=(int)(l/40);
+ l-=(long)(i*40);
+ }
+- if (buf && (buf_len > 0))
++ if (buf && (buf_len > 1))
+ {
+ *buf++ = i + '0';
++ *buf = '\0';
+ buf_len--;
+ }
+ n++;
+@@ -571,9 +573,10 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name)
+ i = strlen(bndec);
+ if (buf)
+ {
+- if (buf_len > 0)
++ if (buf_len > 1)
+ {
+ *buf++ = '.';
++ *buf = '\0';
+ buf_len--;
+ }
+ BUF_strlcpy(buf,bndec,buf_len);
+@@ -807,4 +810,3 @@ err:
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ return(ok);
+ }
+-
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
diff --git a/external/openssl/CVE-2014-3509.patch b/external/openssl/CVE-2014-3509.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..45c9462
--- /dev/null
+++ b/external/openssl/CVE-2014-3509.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From 86788e1ee6908a5b3a4c95fa80caa4b724a8a434 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Gabor Tyukasz <Gabor.Tyukasz at logmein.com>
+Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 23:42:06 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix race condition in ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext
+
+CVE-2014-3509
+Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh at openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
+---
+ ssl/t1_lib.c | 17 ++++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+index 8167a51..022a4fb 100644
+--- a/a/ssl/t1_lib.c
++++ b/b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+@@ -1555,15 +1555,18 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
+ *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
+- if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
+- if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
++ if (!s->hit)
+ {
+- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+- return 0;
++ s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
++ if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
++ if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
++ {
++ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++ return 0;
++ }
++ s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
++ memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
+ }
+- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
+- memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
+ #if 0
+ fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
+ sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
diff --git a/external/openssl/CVE-2014-3510.patch b/external/openssl/CVE-2014-3510.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5cdc5d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/external/openssl/CVE-2014-3510.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+From 88ae012c8092852f03c50f6461175271104b4c8a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Emilia=20K=C3=A4sper?= <emilia at openssl.org>
+Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 22:15:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix DTLS anonymous EC(DH) denial of service
+
+CVE-2014-3510
+
+Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve at openssl.org>
+---
+ ssl/d1_clnt.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++--
+ ssl/s3_clnt.c | 7 +++++++
+ 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssl/d1_clnt.c b/ssl/d1_clnt.c
+index 65dbb4a..fd6562c 100644
+--- a/a/ssl/d1_clnt.c
++++ b/b/ssl/d1_clnt.c
+@@ -996,6 +996,13 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+ RSA *rsa;
+ unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+
++ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
++ {
++ /* We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. */
++ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++ goto err;
++ }
++
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
+ rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
+ else
+@@ -1186,6 +1193,13 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+ {
+ DH *dh_srvr,*dh_clnt;
+
++ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
++ {
++ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
++ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
++ goto err;
++ }
++
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
+ dh_srvr=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
+ else
+@@ -1245,6 +1259,13 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+ int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
+ int field_size = 0;
+
++ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
++ {
++ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
++ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
++ goto err;
++ }
++
+ /* Did we send out the client's
+ * ECDH share for use in premaster
+ * computation as part of client certificate?
+@@ -1720,5 +1741,3 @@ int dtls1_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
+ /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
+ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ }
+-
+-
+diff --git a/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+index 2afb892..df05f78 100644
+--- a/a/ssl/s3_clnt.c
++++ b/b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+@@ -2253,6 +2253,13 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+ RSA *rsa;
+ unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+
++ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
++ {
++ /* We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. */
++ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++ goto err;
++ }
++
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
+ rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
+ else
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
diff --git a/external/openssl/CVE-2014-3511.patch b/external/openssl/CVE-2014-3511.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4b5b9c6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/external/openssl/CVE-2014-3511.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+From fc4f4cdb8bf9981904e652abf69b892a45bddacf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: David Benjamin <davidben at google.com>
+Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 22:32:21 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix protocol downgrade bug in case of fragmented packets
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2014-3511
+
+Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia at openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Bodo Möller <bodo at openssl.org>
+---
+ ssl/s23_srvr.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssl/s23_srvr.c b/ssl/s23_srvr.c
+index 4877849..2901a6b 100644
+--- a/a/ssl/s23_srvr.c
++++ b/b/ssl/s23_srvr.c
+@@ -348,23 +348,19 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ * Client Hello message, this would be difficult, and we'd have
+ * to read more records to find out.
+ * No known SSL 3.0 client fragments ClientHello like this,
+- * so we simply assume TLS 1.0 to avoid protocol version downgrade
+- * attacks. */
++ * so we simply reject such connections to avoid
++ * protocol version downgrade attacks. */
+ if (p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 6)
+ {
+-#if 0
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
+ goto err;
+-#else
+- v[1] = TLS1_VERSION_MINOR;
+-#endif
+ }
+ /* if major version number > 3 set minor to a value
+ * which will use the highest version 3 we support.
+ * If TLS 2.0 ever appears we will need to revise
+ * this....
+ */
+- else if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
++ if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
+ v[1]=0xff;
+ else
+ v[1]=p[10]; /* minor version according to client_version */
+@@ -444,14 +440,34 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ v[0] = p[3]; /* == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR */
+ v[1] = p[4];
+
++ /* An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
++ * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
++ * record. It's format is:
++ * Byte Content
++ * 0-1 msg_length
++ * 2 msg_type
++ * 3-4 version
++ * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
++ * 7-8 session_id_length
++ * 9-10 challenge_length
++ * ... ...
++ */
+ n=((p[0]&0x7f)<<8)|p[1];
+ if (n > (1024*4))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
+ goto err;
+ }
++ if (n < 9)
++ {
++ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
++ goto err;
++ }
+
+ j=ssl23_read_bytes(s,n+2);
++ /* We previously read 11 bytes, so if j > 0, we must have
++ * j == n+2 == s->packet_length. We have at least 11 valid
++ * packet bytes. */
+ if (j <= 0) return(j);
+
+ ssl3_finish_mac(s, s->packet+2, s->packet_length-2);
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
diff --git a/external/openssl/CVE-2014-3513.patch b/external/openssl/CVE-2014-3513.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..96d4584
--- /dev/null
+++ b/external/openssl/CVE-2014-3513.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_srtp.c.srtp-leak openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_srtp.c
+--- a/a/ssl/d1_srtp.c.srtp-leak 2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/b/ssl/d1_srtp.c 2014-10-15 13:23:34.253040160 +0200
+@@ -168,25 +168,6 @@ static int find_profile_by_name(char *pr
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+-static int find_profile_by_num(unsigned profile_num,
+- SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE **pptr)
+- {
+- SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *p;
+-
+- p=srtp_known_profiles;
+- while(p->name)
+- {
+- if(p->id == profile_num)
+- {
+- *pptr=p;
+- return 0;
+- }
+- p++;
+- }
+-
+- return 1;
+- }
+-
+ static int ssl_ctx_make_profiles(const char *profiles_string,STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) **out)
+ {
+ STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *profiles;
+@@ -209,11 +190,19 @@ static int ssl_ctx_make_profiles(const c
+ if(!find_profile_by_name(ptr,&p,
+ col ? col-ptr : (int)strlen(ptr)))
+ {
++ if (sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_find(profiles,p) >= 0)
++ {
++ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES,SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
++ sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(profiles);
++ return 1;
++ }
++
+ sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_push(profiles,p);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES,SSL_R_SRTP_UNKNOWN_PROTECTION_PROFILE);
++ sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(profiles);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+@@ -305,13 +294,12 @@ int ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL
+
+ int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,int *al)
+ {
+- SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *cprof,*sprof;
+- STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt=0,*srvr;
++ SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *sprof;
++ STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srvr;
+ int ct;
+ int mki_len;
+- int i,j;
+- int id;
+- int ret;
++ int i, srtp_pref;
++ unsigned int id;
+
+ /* Length value + the MKI length */
+ if(len < 3)
+@@ -341,22 +329,32 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(S
+ return 1;
+ }
+
++ srvr=SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
++ s->srtp_profile = NULL;
++ /* Search all profiles for a match initially */
++ srtp_pref = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr);
+
+- clnt=sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_new_null();
+-
+ while(ct)
+ {
+ n2s(d,id);
+ ct-=2;
+ len-=2;
+
+- if(!find_profile_by_num(id,&cprof))
++ /*
++ * Only look for match in profiles of higher preference than
++ * current match.
++ * If no profiles have been have been configured then this
++ * does nothing.
++ */
++ for (i = 0; i < srtp_pref; i++)
+ {
+- sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_push(clnt,cprof);
+- }
+- else
+- {
+- ; /* Ignore */
++ sprof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr, i);
++ if (sprof->id == id)
++ {
++ s->srtp_profile = sprof;
++ srtp_pref = i;
++ break;
++ }
+ }
+ }
+
+@@ -371,36 +369,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(S
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+- srvr=SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
+-
+- /* Pick our most preferred profile. If no profiles have been
+- configured then the outer loop doesn't run
+- (sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num() = -1)
+- and so we just return without doing anything */
+- for(i=0;i<sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr);i++)
+- {
+- sprof=sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr,i);
+-
+- for(j=0;j<sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);j++)
+- {
+- cprof=sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt,j);
+-
+- if(cprof->id==sprof->id)
+- {
+- s->srtp_profile=sprof;
+- *al=0;
+- ret=0;
+- goto done;
+- }
+- }
+- }
+-
+- ret=0;
+-
+-done:
+- if(clnt) sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(clnt);
+-
+- return ret;
++ return 0;
+ }
+
+ int ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int maxlen)
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_lib.c.srtp-leak openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_lib.c
+--- a/a/ssl/t1_lib.c.srtp-leak 2014-10-15 13:19:59.955202293 +0200
++++ b/b/ssl/t1_lib.c 2014-10-15 13:23:34.254040182 +0200
+@@ -696,7 +696,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsex
+ #endif
+
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+- if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
++ if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
+ {
+ int el;
+
+@@ -829,7 +829,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsex
+ #endif
+
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+- if(s->srtp_profile)
++ if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile)
+ {
+ int el;
+
+@@ -1377,7 +1377,8 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s,
+
+ /* session ticket processed earlier */
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
++ else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
++ && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
+ {
+ if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
+ al))
+@@ -1631,7 +1632,7 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s,
+ }
+ #endif
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
++ else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
+ {
+ if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
+ al))
diff --git a/external/openssl/CVE-2014-3566.patch b/external/openssl/CVE-2014-3566.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c9b37a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/external/openssl/CVE-2014-3566.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,466 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/apps/s_client.c.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/apps/s_client.c
+--- a/a/apps/s_client.c.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 17:06:01.000000000 +0200
++++ b/b/apps/s_client.c 2014-10-15 17:07:36.392502320 +0200
+@@ -336,6 +336,7 @@ static void sc_usage(void)
+ BIO_printf(bio_err," -tls1_1 - just use TLSv1.1\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err," -tls1 - just use TLSv1\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err," -dtls1 - just use DTLSv1\n");
++ BIO_printf(bio_err," -fallback_scsv - send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err," -mtu - set the link layer MTU\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err," -no_tls1_2/-no_tls1_1/-no_tls1/-no_ssl3/-no_ssl2 - turn off that protocol\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err," -bugs - Switch on all SSL implementation bug workarounds\n");
+@@ -616,6 +617,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
+ char *sess_out = NULL;
+ struct sockaddr peer;
+ int peerlen = sizeof(peer);
++ int fallback_scsv = 0;
+ int enable_timeouts = 0 ;
+ long socket_mtu = 0;
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
+@@ -829,6 +831,10 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
+ socket_mtu = atol(*(++argv));
+ }
+ #endif
++ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-fallback_scsv") == 0)
++ {
++ fallback_scsv = 1;
++ }
+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-bugs") == 0)
+ bugs=1;
+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-keyform") == 0)
+@@ -1240,6 +1246,10 @@ bad:
+ SSL_set_session(con, sess);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+ }
++
++ if (fallback_scsv)
++ SSL_set_mode(con, SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV);
++
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (servername != NULL)
+ {
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/s_client.pod.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/s_client.pod
+--- a/a/doc/apps/s_client.pod.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 17:06:01.000000000 +0200
++++ b/b/doc/apps/s_client.pod 2014-10-15 17:08:17.354427053 +0200
+@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
+ [B<-no_ssl2>]
+ [B<-no_ssl3>]
+ [B<-no_tls1>]
++[B<-fallback_scsv>]
+ [B<-bugs>]
+ [B<-cipher cipherlist>]
+ [B<-starttls protocol>]
+@@ -187,6 +188,10 @@
+ work if TLS is turned off with the B<-no_tls> option others will only
+ support SSL v2 and may need the B<-ssl2> option.
+
++=item B<-fallback_scsv>
++
++Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello.
++
+ =item B<-bugs>
+
+ there are several known bug in SSL and TLS implementations. Adding this
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_mode.pod.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_mode.pod
+--- a/a/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_mode.pod.fallback-scsv 2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/b/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_mode.pod 2014-10-15 17:09:57.577689637 +0200
+@@ -71,6 +71,12 @@ SSL_CTX->freelist_max_len, which default
+ save around 34k per idle SSL connection.
+ This flag has no effect on SSL v2 connections, or on DTLS connections.
+
++=item SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
++
++Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello.
++To be set by applications that reconnect with a downgraded protocol
++version; see draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00 for details.
++
+ =back
+
+ =head1 RETURN VALUES
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/dtls1.h.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/dtls1.h
+--- a/a/ssl/dtls1.h.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 14:39:30.862907615 +0200
++++ b/b/ssl/dtls1.h 2014-10-15 14:39:30.973910121 +0200
+@@ -84,6 +84,8 @@ extern "C" {
+ #endif
+
+ #define DTLS1_VERSION 0xFEFF
++#define DTLS_MAX_VERSION DTLS1_VERSION
++
+ #define DTLS1_BAD_VER 0x0100
+
+ #if 0
+@@ -284,4 +286,3 @@ typedef struct dtls1_record_data_st
+ }
+ #endif
+ #endif
+-
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_lib.c.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_lib.c
+--- a/a/ssl/d1_lib.c.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 14:39:30.911908721 +0200
++++ b/b/ssl/d1_lib.c 2014-10-15 14:39:30.973910121 +0200
+@@ -263,6 +263,16 @@ long dtls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long la
+ case DTLS_CTRL_LISTEN:
+ ret = dtls1_listen(s, parg);
+ break;
++ case SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION:
++ /* For library-internal use; checks that the current protocol
++ * is the highest enabled version (according to s->ctx->method,
++ * as version negotiation may have changed s->method). */
++#if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_VERSION
++# error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_VERSION.
++#endif
++ /* Just one protocol version is supported so far;
++ * fail closed if the version is not as expected. */
++ return s->version == DTLS_MAX_VERSION;
+
+ default:
+ ret = ssl3_ctrl(s, cmd, larg, parg);
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_err.c.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_err.c
+--- a/a/ssl/ssl_err.c.fallback-scsv 2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/b/ssl/ssl_err.c 2014-10-15 14:39:30.973910121 +0200
+@@ -382,6 +382,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST) ,"https proxy request"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST) ,"http request"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING) ,"illegal padding"},
++{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK),"inappropriate fallback"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION),"inconsistent compression"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH),"invalid challenge length"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND) ,"invalid command"},
+@@ -528,6 +529,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPTION_FAILED),"tlsv1 alert decryption failed"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPT_ERROR),"tlsv1 alert decrypt error"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_EXPORT_RESTRICTION),"tlsv1 alert export restriction"},
++{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK),"tlsv1 alert inappropriate fallback"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY),"tlsv1 alert insufficient security"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR),"tlsv1 alert internal error"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION),"tlsv1 alert no renegotiation"},
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl.h.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl.h
+--- a/a/ssl/ssl.h.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 14:39:30.940909375 +0200
++++ b/b/ssl/ssl.h 2014-10-15 14:41:46.174962343 +0200
+@@ -641,6 +641,10 @@
+ * TLS only.) "Released" buffers are put onto a free-list in the context
+ * or just freed (depending on the context's setting for freelist_max_len). */
+ #define SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS 0x00000010L
++/* Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello.
++ * To be set by applications that reconnect with a downgraded protocol
++ * version; see draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00 for details. */
++#define SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV 0x00000080L
+
+ /* Note: SSL[_CTX]_set_{options,mode} use |= op on the previous value,
+ * they cannot be used to clear bits. */
+@@ -1499,6 +1503,7 @@
+ #define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
+ #define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE
+ #define SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY /* fatal */
++#define SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK /* fatal */
+
+ #define SSL_ERROR_NONE 0
+ #define SSL_ERROR_SSL 1
+@@ -1609,6 +1614,8 @@
+ #define SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS 82
+ #define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS 83
+
++#define SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION 119
++
+ #define DTLSv1_get_timeout(ssl, arg) \
+ SSL_ctrl(ssl,DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT,0, (void *)arg)
+ #define DTLSv1_handle_timeout(ssl) \
+@@ -2362,6 +2369,7 @@
+ #define SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST 155
+ #define SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST 156
+ #define SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING 283
++#define SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 373
+ #define SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION 340
+ #define SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH 158
+ #define SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND 280
+@@ -2508,6 +2516,7 @@
+ #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPTION_FAILED 1021
+ #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPT_ERROR 1051
+ #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_EXPORT_RESTRICTION 1060
++#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 1086
+ #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY 1071
+ #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR 1080
+ #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION 1100
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_lib.c.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+--- a/a/ssl/ssl_lib.c.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 14:39:30.912908743 +0200
++++ b/b/ssl/ssl_lib.c 2014-10-15 14:39:30.975910166 +0200
+@@ -1383,6 +1383,8 @@ int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STAC
+
+ if (sk == NULL) return(0);
+ q=p;
++ if (put_cb == NULL)
++ put_cb = s->method->put_cipher_by_char;
+
+ for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
+ {
+@@ -1402,24 +1404,36 @@ int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STAC
+ s->psk_client_callback == NULL)
+ continue;
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+- j = put_cb ? put_cb(c,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,c,p);
++ j = put_cb(c,p);
+ p+=j;
+ }
+- /* If p == q, no ciphers and caller indicates an error. Otherwise
+- * add SCSV if not renegotiating.
+- */
+- if (p != q && !s->renegotiate)
++ /* If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error.
++ * Otherwise, add applicable SCSVs. */
++ if (p != q)
+ {
+- static SSL_CIPHER scsv =
++ if (!s->renegotiate)
+ {
+- 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
+- };
+- j = put_cb ? put_cb(&scsv,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,&scsv,p);
+- p+=j;
++ static SSL_CIPHER scsv =
++ {
++ 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
++ };
++ j = put_cb(&scsv,p);
++ p+=j;
+ #ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
+- fprintf(stderr, "SCSV sent by client\n");
++ fprintf(stderr, "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV sent by client\n");
+ #endif
+- }
++ }
++
++ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
++ {
++ static SSL_CIPHER scsv =
++ {
++ 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
++ };
++ j = put_cb(&scsv,p);
++ p+=j;
++ }
++ }
+
+ return(p-q);
+ }
+@@ -1430,11 +1444,12 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_ciphe
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+ int i,n;
++
+ if (s->s3)
+ s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
+
+ n=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL);
+- if ((num%n) != 0)
++ if (n == 0 || (num%n) != 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
+ return(NULL);
+@@ -1449,7 +1464,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_ciphe
+
+ for (i=0; i<num; i+=n)
+ {
+- /* Check for SCSV */
++ /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
+ if (s->s3 && (n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
+ (p[n-2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
+ (p[n-1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff)))
+@@ -1469,6 +1484,23 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_ciphe
+ continue;
+ }
+
++ /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
++ if ((n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
++ (p[n-2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
++ (p[n-1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff)))
++ {
++ /* The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher version.
++ * Fail if the current version is an unexpected downgrade. */
++ if (!SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, 0, NULL))
++ {
++ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
++ if (s->s3)
++ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
++ goto err;
++ }
++ continue;
++ }
++
+ c=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,p);
+ p+=n;
+ if (c != NULL)
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl3.h.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl3.h
+--- a/a/ssl/ssl3.h.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 14:39:30.949909579 +0200
++++ b/b/ssl/ssl3.h 2014-10-15 14:39:30.975910166 +0200
+@@ -128,9 +128,14 @@
+ extern "C" {
+ #endif
+
+-/* Signalling cipher suite value: from draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation-03.txt */
++/* Signalling cipher suite value from RFC 5746
++ * (TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV) */
+ #define SSL3_CK_SCSV 0x030000FF
+
++/* Signalling cipher suite value from draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00
++ * (TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV) */
++#define SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV 0x03005600
++
+ #define SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_MD5 0x03000001
+ #define SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_SHA 0x03000002
+ #define SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_40_MD5 0x03000003
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_lib.c.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_lib.c
+--- a/a/ssl/s2_lib.c.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 14:39:30.901908495 +0200
++++ b/b/ssl/s2_lib.c 2014-10-15 14:39:30.975910166 +0200
+@@ -391,6 +391,8 @@ long ssl2_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long lar
+ case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESSION_REUSED:
+ ret=s->hit;
+ break;
++ case SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION:
++ return ssl3_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, larg, parg);
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+@@ -437,7 +439,7 @@ int ssl2_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CI
+ if (p != NULL)
+ {
+ l=c->id;
+- if ((l & 0xff000000) != 0x02000000) return(0);
++ if ((l & 0xff000000) != 0x02000000 && l != SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV) return(0);
+ p[0]=((unsigned char)(l>>16L))&0xFF;
+ p[1]=((unsigned char)(l>> 8L))&0xFF;
+ p[2]=((unsigned char)(l ))&0xFF;
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s23_clnt.c.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s23_clnt.c
+--- a/a/ssl/s23_clnt.c.fallback-scsv 2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/b/ssl/s23_clnt.c 2014-10-15 14:39:30.975910166 +0200
+@@ -715,6 +715,9 @@ static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s
+ goto err;
+ }
+
++ /* ensure that TLS_MAX_VERSION is up-to-date */
++ OPENSSL_assert(s->version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION);
++
+ if (p[0] == SSL3_RT_ALERT && p[5] != SSL3_AL_WARNING)
+ {
+ /* fatal alert */
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s23_srvr.c.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s23_srvr.c
+--- a/a/ssl/s23_srvr.c.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 14:39:30.966909962 +0200
++++ b/b/ssl/s23_srvr.c 2014-10-15 14:39:30.976910188 +0200
+@@ -421,6 +421,9 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ }
+ }
+
++ /* ensure that TLS_MAX_VERSION is up-to-date */
++ OPENSSL_assert(s->version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION);
++
+ #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (FIPS_mode() && (s->version < TLS1_VERSION))
+ {
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_enc.c.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_enc.c
+--- a/a/ssl/s3_enc.c.fallback-scsv 2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ b/b/ssl/s3_enc.c 2014-10-15 14:39:30.976910188 +0200
+@@ -892,7 +892,7 @@ int ssl3_alert_code(int code)
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
++ case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:return(TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+ default: return(-1);
+ }
+ }
+-
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_lib.c.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_lib.c
+--- a/a/ssl/s3_lib.c.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 14:39:30.941909398 +0200
++++ b/b/ssl/s3_lib.c 2014-10-15 14:39:30.976910188 +0200
+@@ -3350,6 +3350,33 @@
+ #endif
+
+ #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
++
++ case SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION:
++ /* For library-internal use; checks that the current protocol
++ * is the highest enabled version (according to s->ctx->method,
++ * as version negotiation may have changed s->method). */
++ if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version)
++ return 1;
++ /* Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD
++ * (not at its highest protocol version). */
++ if (s->ctx->method->version == SSLv23_method()->version)
++ {
++#if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION
++# error Code needs update for SSLv23_method() support beyond TLS1_2_VERSION.
++#endif
++ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2))
++ return s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION;
++ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1))
++ return s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION;
++ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
++ return s->version == TLS1_VERSION;
++ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
++ return s->version == SSL3_VERSION;
++ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2))
++ return s->version == SSL2_VERSION;
++ }
++ return 0; /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
++
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+@@ -3709,6 +3736,7 @@
+ break;
+ #endif
+ #endif
++
+ default:
+ return(0);
+ }
+@@ -4279,4 +4307,3 @@
+ return SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256;
+ return alg2;
+ }
+-
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/tls1.h.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/tls1.h
+--- a/a/ssl/tls1.h.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 14:39:30.775905650 +0200
++++ b/b/ssl/tls1.h 2014-10-15 14:39:30.976910188 +0200
+@@ -159,17 +159,19 @@ extern "C" {
+
+ #define TLS1_ALLOW_EXPERIMENTAL_CIPHERSUITES 0
+
++#define TLS1_VERSION 0x0301
++#define TLS1_1_VERSION 0x0302
+ #define TLS1_2_VERSION 0x0303
+-#define TLS1_2_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03
+-#define TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR 0x03
++#define TLS_MAX_VERSION TLS1_2_VERSION
++
++#define TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03
++#define TLS1_VERSION_MINOR 0x01
+
+-#define TLS1_1_VERSION 0x0302
+ #define TLS1_1_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03
+ #define TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR 0x02
+
+-#define TLS1_VERSION 0x0301
+-#define TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03
+-#define TLS1_VERSION_MINOR 0x01
++#define TLS1_2_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03
++#define TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR 0x03
+
+ #define TLS1_get_version(s) \
+ ((s->version >> 8) == TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR ? s->version : 0)
+@@ -187,6 +189,7 @@ extern "C" {
+ #define TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION 70 /* fatal */
+ #define TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY 71 /* fatal */
+ #define TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR 80 /* fatal */
++#define TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 86 /* fatal */
+ #define TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED 90
+ #define TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION 100
+ /* codes 110-114 are from RFC3546 */
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_enc.c.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_enc.c
+--- a/a/ssl/t1_enc.c.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 14:39:30.936909285 +0200
++++ b/b/ssl/t1_enc.c 2014-10-15 14:39:30.977910211 +0200
+@@ -1265,6 +1265,7 @@ int tls1_alert_code(int code)
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE);
+ case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE);
+ case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
++ case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:return(TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+ #if 0 /* not appropriate for TLS, not used for DTLS */
+ case DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE: return
+ (DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
diff --git a/external/openssl/CVE-2014-3567.patch b/external/openssl/CVE-2014-3567.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..db158f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/external/openssl/CVE-2014-3567.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_lib.c.ticket-leak openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_lib.c
+--- a/a/ssl/t1_lib.c.ticket-leak 2014-10-15 13:19:26.825454374 +0200
++++ b/b/ssl/t1_lib.c 2014-10-15 13:19:59.955202293 +0200
+@@ -2280,7 +2280,10 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, co
+ HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
++ {
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ return 2;
++ }
+ /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
+ /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
+ p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
diff --git a/external/openssl/UnpackedTarball_openssl.mk b/external/openssl/UnpackedTarball_openssl.mk
index 07a775e..cbb7745 100644
--- a/external/openssl/UnpackedTarball_openssl.mk
+++ b/external/openssl/UnpackedTarball_openssl.mk
@@ -101,6 +101,16 @@ $(eval $(call gb_UnpackedTarball_add_patches,openssl,\
external/openssl/CVE-2014-0221.patch \
external/openssl/CVE-2014-0224.patch \
external/openssl/CVE-2014-3470.patch \
+ external/openssl/CVE-2014-3505.patch \
+ external/openssl/CVE-2014-3506.patch \
+ external/openssl/CVE-2014-3507.patch \
+ external/openssl/CVE-2014-3508.patch \
+ external/openssl/CVE-2014-3509.patch \
+ external/openssl/CVE-2014-3510.patch \
+ external/openssl/CVE-2014-3511.patch \
+ external/openssl/CVE-2014-3513.patch \
+ external/openssl/CVE-2014-3567.patch \
+ external/openssl/CVE-2014-3566.patch \
$(if $(filter LINUX FREEBSD ANDROID,$(OS)),external/openssl/openssllnx.patch) \
$(if $(filter WNTGCC,$(OS)$(COM)),external/openssl/opensslmingw.patch) \
$(if $(filter MSC,$(COM)),external/openssl/opensslwnt.patch) \
More information about the Libreoffice-commits
mailing list