[Pm-utils] some simple patches from fedora

Till Maas opensource at till.name
Wed Jan 30 07:28:41 PST 2008

On Wed January 30 2008, Victor Lowther wrote:

> True.  The way to defend against these scenarios is to ensure that all
> our files and directories are owned by and only writable by root.  If
> an intruder already has root, pm-utils cannot defend against any
> actions that user can take.

If I find the time, I will test whether selinux would prevent pm-utils from 
cleaning out /etc/passwd when the logfile is a symlink to it. I guess selinux 
could help here.

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