[systemd-commits] NEWS README man/systemd.exec.xml src/core src/nspawn src/systemctl src/timesync
Lennart Poettering
lennart at kemper.freedesktop.org
Sun May 18 08:41:43 PDT 2014
NEWS | 2 +-
README | 2 +-
man/systemd.exec.xml | 2 +-
src/core/load-fragment-gperf.gperf.m4 | 2 +-
src/core/load-fragment.c | 2 +-
src/core/load-fragment.h | 2 +-
src/nspawn/nspawn.c | 2 +-
src/systemctl/systemctl.c | 2 +-
src/timesync/timesyncd.c | 6 +++---
9 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
New commits:
commit f1721625e7145977ba705e169580f2eb0002600c
Author: Nis Martensen <nis.martensen at web.de>
Date: Sun May 18 15:43:18 2014 +0200
fix spelling of privilege
diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
index f90d7f8..cee62b1 100644
--- a/NEWS
+++ b/NEWS
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ CHANGES WITH 211:
directory's lifetime is bound to the daemon runtime and that
the daemon starts up with an empty directory each time. This
is particularly useful when writing services that drop
- priviliges using the User= or Group= setting.
+ privileges using the User= or Group= setting.
* The DeviceAllow= unit setting now supports globbing for
matching against device group names.
diff --git a/README b/README
index 4e2f996..0031fac 100644
--- a/README
+++ b/README
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ USERS AND GROUPS:
The NTP daemon requires the "systemd-timesync" system user and
group to exist. During execution this network facing service
- will drop priviliges (with the exception of CAP_SYS_TIME) and
+ will drop privileges (with the exception of CAP_SYS_TIME) and
assume this uid/gid for security reasons.
WARNINGS:
diff --git a/man/systemd.exec.xml b/man/systemd.exec.xml
index 22f0768..3f27d13 100644
--- a/man/systemd.exec.xml
+++ b/man/systemd.exec.xml
@@ -1275,7 +1275,7 @@
<literal>/</literal>, i.e. must refer
to simple directories to create or
remove. This is particularly useful
- for unpriviliges daemons that cannot
+ for unprivileged daemons that cannot
create runtime directories in
<filename>/run</filename> due to lack
of privileges, and to make sure the
diff --git a/src/core/load-fragment-gperf.gperf.m4 b/src/core/load-fragment-gperf.gperf.m4
index 21bccbb..4f8a2dd 100644
--- a/src/core/load-fragment-gperf.gperf.m4
+++ b/src/core/load-fragment-gperf.gperf.m4
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ $1.Capabilities, config_parse_exec_capabilities, 0,
$1.SecureBits, config_parse_exec_secure_bits, 0, offsetof($1, exec_context)
$1.CapabilityBoundingSet, config_parse_bounding_set, 0, offsetof($1, exec_context.capability_bounding_set_drop)
$1.TimerSlackNSec, config_parse_nsec, 0, offsetof($1, exec_context.timer_slack_nsec)
-$1.NoNewPrivileges, config_parse_no_new_priviliges, 0, offsetof($1, exec_context)
+$1.NoNewPrivileges, config_parse_no_new_privileges, 0, offsetof($1, exec_context)
m4_ifdef(`HAVE_SECCOMP',
`$1.SystemCallFilter, config_parse_syscall_filter, 0, offsetof($1, exec_context)
$1.SystemCallArchitectures, config_parse_syscall_archs, 0, offsetof($1, exec_context.syscall_archs)
diff --git a/src/core/load-fragment.c b/src/core/load-fragment.c
index 14c194b..25a3905 100644
--- a/src/core/load-fragment.c
+++ b/src/core/load-fragment.c
@@ -3029,7 +3029,7 @@ int config_parse_namespace_path_strv(
return 0;
}
-int config_parse_no_new_priviliges(
+int config_parse_no_new_privileges(
const char* unit,
const char *filename,
unsigned line,
diff --git a/src/core/load-fragment.h b/src/core/load-fragment.h
index 242fd27..9ef9caa 100644
--- a/src/core/load-fragment.h
+++ b/src/core/load-fragment.h
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ int config_parse_address_families(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsign
int config_parse_runtime_directory(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata);
int config_parse_set_status(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata);
int config_parse_namespace_path_strv(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata);
-int config_parse_no_new_priviliges(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata);
+int config_parse_no_new_privileges(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata);
int config_parse_cpu_quota(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata);
/* gperf prototypes */
diff --git a/src/nspawn/nspawn.c b/src/nspawn/nspawn.c
index 6be4dca..9d9238f 100644
--- a/src/nspawn/nspawn.c
+++ b/src/nspawn/nspawn.c
@@ -3057,7 +3057,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
fds = NULL;
/* Wait until the child reported that it is ready with
- * all it needs to do with priviliges. After we got
+ * all it needs to do with privileges. After we got
* the notification we can make the process join its
* cgroup which might limit what it can do */
eventfd_read(child_ready_fd, &x);
diff --git a/src/systemctl/systemctl.c b/src/systemctl/systemctl.c
index 6e98c05..a99759f 100644
--- a/src/systemctl/systemctl.c
+++ b/src/systemctl/systemctl.c
@@ -5923,7 +5923,7 @@ static int systemctl_parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) {
case 'r':
if (geteuid() != 0) {
- log_error("--recursive requires root priviliges.");
+ log_error("--recursive requires root privileges.");
return -EPERM;
}
diff --git a/src/timesync/timesyncd.c b/src/timesync/timesyncd.c
index 19e6d67..6e63e34 100644
--- a/src/timesync/timesyncd.c
+++ b/src/timesync/timesyncd.c
@@ -1141,7 +1141,7 @@ static int manager_network_monitor_listen(Manager *m) {
return 0;
}
-static int drop_priviliges(void) {
+static int drop_privileges(void) {
static const cap_value_t bits[] = {
CAP_SYS_TIME,
};
@@ -1152,7 +1152,7 @@ static int drop_priviliges(void) {
gid_t gid;
int r;
- /* Unfortunately we cannot leave privilige dropping to PID 1
+ /* Unfortunately we cannot leave privilege dropping to PID 1
* here, since we want to run as user but want to keep te
* CAP_SYS_TIME capability. Since file capabilities have been
* introduced this cannot be done across exec() anymore,
@@ -1231,7 +1231,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
umask(0022);
- r = drop_priviliges();
+ r = drop_privileges();
if (r < 0)
goto out;
More information about the systemd-commits
mailing list