[systemd-devel] Keyring service as a natural use-case for systemd?

Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek zbyszek at in.waw.pl
Fri Jun 27 13:47:12 PDT 2014


On Fri, Jun 27, 2014 at 05:47:01PM +0200, Lennart Poettering wrote:
> On Fri, 27.06.14 18:08, Mantas Mikulėnas (grawity at gmail.com) wrote:
> 
> > (The agents usually set themselves as undumpable and untraceable to avoid
> > key extraction by the same user's other processes.)
> 
> Honestly, playing these games with trying to protect a user processes
> from its own user, are snake oil, little else. That's not how Unix
> works, and neither does Linux. Access control is inherently bound to
> user IDs, nothing else, and just turning off traceability or dumpability
> might protect you from accidental leaking, but certainly not from any
> real threat.
Unless you are forwarding the agent connection to a remote machine?

Zbyszek



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