<html> <head> <base href="https://bugs.freedesktop.org/"> </head> <body> <div> <a class="bz_bug_link bz_status_RESOLVED bz_closed" title="RESOLVED FIXED - Allow another local user to run programs on a WAYLAND_DISPLAY" href="https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=84817#c10">Comment # 10</a> on <a class="bz_bug_link bz_status_RESOLVED bz_closed" title="RESOLVED FIXED - Allow another local user to run programs on a WAYLAND_DISPLAY" href="https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=84817">bug 84817</a> from <a class="email" href="mailto:t4155553@mvrht.net" title="Paranoik <t4155553@mvrht.net>"> Paranoik</a> <pre>(In reply to Daniel Stone from <a href="show_bug.cgi?id=84817#c8">comment #8</a>) > > It's much more flexible than that. Wayland doesn't do a user lookup at all, > or rely on particular authentication files: it relies on filesystem > permissions to restrict who can access the socket. > > You can grant access to the socket to whichever uid you like, or you can > specifically bind-mount the uid into a particular container. So it is more > granular, more flexible, but also more secure. What is the problem to let everyone access the desktop by default? Why is it blocked? What is this wayland sudo talk is all about? The modern desktop compositor should have been developed with MAC concept in mind. Apps must be isolated and it shouldn't be a security hole to grant programs run under different restricted user accounts to access desktop and interact with the user.</pre> </div> <hr> You are receiving this mail because: <ul> <li>You are the assignee for the bug.</li> </ul> </body> </html>