Security issue with .desktop files revisited

[Thiago Macieira]

Rodney Dawes wrote:
>actually use their computer. And .desktop files are in fact data and
>not executable scripts. Requiring +x just requires you to make them
>behave more like scripts.

The fact that you can write a whole shell script in the Exec= line 
makes .desktop files de-facto scripts. They are shell scripts with a 
special syntax and one that allows you to change the icon.

>We need to fix the semantics of the Icon field as well. This is actually
>easy to specify for common desktop applications. We can just rely on the
>naming scheme for application icons that is in the Icon Naming
>Specification, and specify the proper way to deal with types of .desktop
>files which are not Type=Application as well, such as links to webdav or
>smb shares.

Agreed. This makes sense.

>Users are going to just get into the habit of always doing chmod
>+x, as we have already been doing for perl/python/etc... scripts that
>we download off the web.

If they have that habit, they may be doing even nastier things than what a 
shell script is capable of. A Perl script could be complex enough to 
install backdoors and log keystrokes.

>Setting +x is not a solution, it's a problem.

I don't see how enforcing the bit could cause more harm than right now.

-- 
Thiago Macieira  -  thiago (AT) macieira.info - thiago (AT) kde.org
  thiago.macieira (AT) trolltech.com     Trolltech AS
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