Announcing dbus 1.13.12

[Dorian ROSSE]

I have all this errors for dbus by an update task :

Failed to open connection to "system" message bus: Did not receive a reply. Possible causes include: the remote application did not send a reply, the message bus security policy blocked the reply, the reply timeout expired, or the network connection was broken.

What should I do ?

Thank you in advance to help me,

Regards.


Dorian ROSSE.

Provenance : Courrier<https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=550986> pour Windows 10

________________________________
De : Dorian ROSSE
Envoyé : Tuesday, June 11, 2019 8:35:25 PM
À : Simon McVittie; dbus at lists.freedesktop.org
Objet : RE: Announcing dbus 1.13.12


Hello,


I am running this dbus :

Traitement des actions différées (« triggers ») pour dbus (1.12.2-1ubuntu1) ...

Why too much older ?

Thank you in advance to explain why I run this too much older dbus,

Regards.


Dorian ROSSE.



Provenance : Courrier<https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=550986> pour Windows 10



________________________________
De : dbus <dbus-bounces at lists.freedesktop.org> de la part de Simon McVittie <smcv at collabora.com>
Envoyé : Tuesday, June 11, 2019 5:05:14 PM
À : dbus at lists.freedesktop.org
Objet : Announcing dbus 1.13.12

This is a development branch for the adventurous, and comes with a risk
of regressions. OS distributions should stay with the 1.12.x branch,
unless they can commit to following the 1.13.x branch until it reaches
a 1.14.0 stable release at an unspecified point in the future.

This version incorporates the same security fix as the 1.12.16 stable
release.

<http://dbus.freedesktop.org/releases/dbus/dbus-1.13.12.tar.xz>
<http://dbus.freedesktop.org/releases/dbus/dbus-1.13.12.tar.xz.asc>
git tag: dbus-1.13.12

The “patio squirrel” release.

Security fixes:

• CVE-2019-12749: Do not attempt to carry out DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1
  authentication for identities that differ from the user running the
  DBusServer. Previously, a local attacker could manipulate symbolic
  links in their own home directory to bypass authentication and connect
  to a DBusServer with elevated privileges. The standard system and
  session dbus-daemons in their default configuration were immune to this
  attack because they did not allow DBUS_COOKIE_SHA1, but third-party
  users of DBusServer such as Upstart could be vulnerable.
  Thanks to Joe Vennix of Apple Information Security.
  (dbus#269, Simon McVittie)

Enhancements:

• dbus-daemon <allow> and <deny> rules can now specify a
  send_destination_prefix attribute, which is like a combination of
  send_destination and the arg0namespace keyword in match rules: a rule
  with send_destination_prefix="com.example.Foo" matches messages sent to
  any destination that is in the queue to own well-known names like
  com.example.Foo or com.example.Foo.A.B (but not com.example.Foobar).
  (dbus!85, Adrian Szyndela)

--
Simon McVittie, Collabora Ltd.
on behalf of the dbus maintainers
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