trusted X and cut&paste

[Ted X Toth]

For the last couple of months I've been working with the XACE branch in 
an MLS (multilevel security) environment (FC6 currently). Recently I've 
been investigating the issue of cut&paste between windows at different 
levels. My initial work using gnome-terminals showed that the X 
selection protocol is being used in ways that don't support previous 
architectures implemented by selection managers to solve this problem. 
And after talking to others I'm getting the feeling that this may just 
be the tip of the iceberg. Obviously patching every desktop/window 
manager/application is not a viable solution. I've heard that there is a 
movement to try and 'fix' cut&paste and I'm very interested in knowing 
what's happening and making sure that there is an understanding of a 
need to be able to hook cut&paste in order to make security related 
decisions.