Migration of windows between displays

[Avery Pennarun]

On Thu, Nov 11, 2004 at 04:46:42PM -0500, Jim Gettys wrote:

> Arguably, stealing entire application is more dangerous than sniffing
> input events.

Arguable?  It's like saying that giving someone root access on my system is
more dangerous that giving them rw access to /dev/hda.  Theoretically, yes,
but in the end, if I can trust them to access every byte on my hard drive, I
had *better* be able to trust them to do everything else they might want to
do.

While X multi-user display security is an interesting issue with many useful
applications, we should solve it *once* in the right place.  This particular
feature seems, as far as I can tell from the discussion so far, to have
absolutely no special needs for security besides that already offered by X
(ie. need for the usual xauth cookies on both the source and destination
displays).

While I gather that, since Philip Blundell already *implemented* this type
of security, it must be useful for something, you guys have not made clear
why that is.  A proper non-broken XSecurity-like thing should solve any
imaginable security problems with this feature and more.  Meanwhile, if
you're connected to the same X server as me, I had *better* trust you
completely; that has nothing to do with this feature.

Have fun,

Avery